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ABSTRACT
In the last century, modern technology has significantly increased human
interaction across the globe. The growing globalization of our society has created new areas
of interest for many academics. This thesis explores the topic of international crime—
specifically, state perpetrated crimes against humanity. Criminologists have become
increasingly interested in large-scale atrocities and several theories on the topic have been
perpetuated in the last few decades. Through a case study, this research determined that
current theories are capable of explaining crimes against humanity in North Korea.
Additionally, the findings suggest that international institutions should create programs
that utilize restorative justice techniques.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
During the 20th century, state-sponsored crimes were responsible for more deaths
than all other crimes combined (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003; Hagan & RymondRichmond, 2009; Maier-Katkin, Mears, & Bernard, 2009). Accordingly, research in
political science, sociology, criminology, international relations, and psychology has
drawn increasing attention to crimes against humanity and other large-scale atrocities
involving war crimes and genocide. Crimes against humanity gained international attention
following the atrocities of World War II and were initially outlined by the Nuremburg trials
to include “atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population” (Allied Control Council, 1945 as cited by Maier-Katkin et
al., 2009). Following Nuremburg, however, scholarly examination of state crime steadily
declined as the Cold War took the spotlight.
The 1990s brought the study of state criminality back into the limelight, as a slew
of atrocities unfolded in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. In Rwanda, widespread killings began
with a power shift between two racial groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus. In Yugoslavia, a
series of wars lead to the dissolution of the country. During these conflicts, several high
ranking officials committed crimes against humanity by engaging in ethnic cleansing—the
extermination of groups of people based on their racial background or religious beliefs. In
response, the international community established criminal tribunals in both countries.
1

These tribunals are responsible for reshaping international laws surrounding crimes against
humanity (CAH) over the last several decades. Additional examples of CAH violations
within the last several decades include the apartheid enforced by the South African
government, the genocide in Darfur ordered by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, and
the killings in Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime (Williams, Ulbrick, & Worboys, 2012).
International laws that address state crime are relatively new, especially in
comparison to the domestic criminal laws that criminologists traditionally study, some of
which can be traced back to common law. With the jurisprudence surrounding these laws
in its infancy, there is a need to investigate international crimes and international responses
in order to promote fair procedures and inform the enforcement of such procedures.
Criminology offers a unique perspective capable of lessening the gap between international
laws and international justice, as criminologists are already familiar with accomplishing
this at the “street” and national levels. Moreover, criminological theory can inform our
understanding of the etiology of state crime and international responses through the
identification of both macro- and micro-level risk factors that can help identify conditions
favorable to the commission of CAH (Harff, 2014; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Olusanya,
2013; Rothe & Friedrichs, 2006).
In March 2013, the UN established a commission of inquiry (COI) on human rights
in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) to determine whether and to what
extent CAH violations are being committed. Its members consisted of Chairman Michael
Kirby (Australia), Sonja Biserko (Serbia), and Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia) (UNGA,
2014). On February 17, 2014 the United Nations acknowledged that CAH violations had
occurred and are occurring in North Korea. According to the COI, North Korean CAH
2

violations include murder, torture, enslavement, rape, forced abortions, imprisonment,
knowingly causing starvation, extermination, and persecution of people based on politics,
religion, and gender.
This thesis utilizes criminological theory to frame the understanding of state
crimes; in particular, it examines the applicability of several recent theories that attempt to
explain crimes against humanity (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009).
Substantively, I use Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) as a case study,
with attention to the etiology of the North Korean government’s transformation into a
perpetrator of CAH, social conditions that may prevent or promote such crimes, and current
international responses to these crimes.
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis will address the precursors and conditions leading to violations of
international law by the government of North Korea (NK), the kinds of crimes the North
Korean government has been accused of committing, how the international community has
responded to law violations in NK, and how international institutions might strengthen
their response in order to prevent future commission of crimes against humanity by the
North Korean regime. This research will be guided by recent theories of CAH articulated
by Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and Maier Katkin et al. (2009). The findings will identify
key turning points, some of which have been articulated in the aforementioned theories,
that help to explain the conditions under which CAH have occurred in NK. This
understanding, informed by conventional criminological theory, can then advise potential
ways in which social institutions might aid in the control and mitigation of CAH by
improving and reinforcing the international response to large-scale atrocities.
3

1.2 AIM OF THE RESEARCH
Through a case study of NK, I will identify CAH violations and examine the
conditions that are conducive to such crimes. For example, several scholars have suggested
that intense societal strain is a precursor to CAH. This thesis will determine if conditions
like widespread strain are present in the North Korean case, as well as examine contributing
conditions like social isolation which is apparent in the case of NK. This study will focus
on distinguishing conditions that denote a high risk of large-scale criminal activity, using
both general criminological theories and more focused theories concerning CAH. A
criminological assessment of CAH violations will also aid in the establishment of better
informed international policies. Furthermore, this research will promote the understanding
of explanatory concepts put forth by other disciplines and encourage interdisciplinary
exploration of state crime.
1.3 SIGNIFIGANCE OF THE RESEARCH
Many scholars have noted the importance of criminological theory for
understanding state-sponsored CAH and have called upon criminologists to study the issue
(Chambliss, 1988; Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, & Parker, 2005; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009;
Turk, 1964). Unfortunately, many of these calls have gone unanswered, with just a few
criminological-oriented articles written on the subject. Several different reasons have been
suggested as to why criminologists have not become more engaged in the study of state
crimes, including a lack of research funding, difficulty obtaining “official” data, lack of
interdisciplinary knowledge, a disconnect between research findings and policy
implementation, mainstream emphasis on quantitative work, the infancy of the
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international criminal justice system, and conceptualization and measurement issues
(Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Matsueda, 2009; Rothe &
Friedrichs, 2006; Smeulers & Hola, 2009).
This current study will build upon the existing body of work that applies
criminological theory and methods to the study of state-sponsored CAH. State criminality
is an ever-growing concern in today’s global society because it threatens international
security and peace. It is therefore incumbent upon politicians and world leaders to better
understand and develop appropriate responses to such large-scale crime, especially when
these crimes are driven by state actors with a multitude of resources at their disposal. The
theories and methods of criminological inquiry provide a valuable perspective for gaining
an understanding of these crimes and identifying potentially effective methods of dealing
with the perpetrators of CAH. Furthermore, a criminological perspective will provide a
check on the fairness and efficacy of laws formulated in our evolving international criminal
justice system. For example, could international justice issues and policy benefit from the
influence of restorative justice ideology? Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the
emerging criminological research on the study of large-scale crime.
1.4 BRIEF INTRODUCTION: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN NK
From 1910-1945, Japanese imperialism engulfed the country of Korea. However,
following World War II, the international community penalized Japan with the loss of its
Korean territory, among other sanctions (Rudolph, 1959). NK’s relationship with the
USSR began after World War II in 1945 when the USSR was assigned trusteeship of the
northern half of Korea. During the trusteeship period, the USSR greatly influenced NK’s
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form of government, international relations tactics, and government policies. The USSR
educated Soviet-born Koreans in the ideologies, policies, and values of communism and
used these “Soviet-Koreans” to disperse communist values into North Korean society
(Eugene Kim, 1985; Gills, 1992; A. Kim, 1970). The trusteeship established by the UNapproved agreement between the US and the USSR bestowed informal control of North
Korea to the Soviets. Over the next several years, Soviet strategy aimed to solidify their
control over North Korea. Furthermore, some scholars also note that as an added measure
of control, the Soviet-Koreans were covertly overseen by Soviet police to ensure the
smooth implementation of communist ideologies. Communism spread throughout Asia,
creating a “brotherhood” of nations (Eugene Kim, 1985; A. Kim, 1970; Y.-S. Kim, 1971).
Additionally, the division of Korea in 1945, separated many families. Korean support for
reunification was overwhelming and as such, reunification was the main goal of North and
South Korea during this period (Gills, 1992; Millett, 2001). The Korean push for
reunification in combination with several other factors resulted in the Korean War which
lasted from 1950-1953.
The end of the Korean War resulted in a political shift away from USSR policies
and an emphasis on Korean nationalism. During this period, Kim Il-Sung emerged as the
Korean leader. Kim had been a household name prior to the Korean War for his efforts
fighting Japanese imperialism. Following the war, North Koreans’ faith in the Soviets
dissolved and Kim became a trusted symbol of national sovereignty (Lankov, 1960;
Millett, 2001; Yang, 1980). With Kim Il-Sung as its leader, NK began to implement a series
of plans intended to rebuild the NK economy and increase domestic industry. By the time
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NK achieved autonomy in 1959, the people had experienced a series of taxing events
including Japanese imperialism, several failed reunification attempts, and war.
Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has been under autocratic rule by
three generations of the Kim family. Upon securing his role as the “Supreme Leader” of
NK, Kim Il-Sung was able to maintain power until his death in 1994. Following his death,
Kim Il-Sung passed his kingdom and his power to his son Kim Jong-Il, who has also since
died. In April 2012, Kim Jong-Un became the third member of the Kim family to reign
over North Korea as its Supreme Leader. As such, the Kim family has reigned supreme
over North Korean government and policies for 55 years—43 years longer than Hitler’s
rule over Germany. The success of the Kim regime can be partly attributed to the
isolationist policies implemented by Kim Il-Sung, many of which remain in place today
(Gills, 1992; Lankov, 1960).
Only recently has the international community expressed increased interest in the
governing tactics of the North Korean Supreme Leader and his followers. On February 17,
2014 the COI released a detailed findings report which formally acknowledged evidence
of North Korean crimes against humanity violations, noting that the “gravity, scale, and
nature of these violations reveal a State that does not have any parallel in the contemporary
world” (UNGA, 2014, p. 15). Additionally, the COI report notes that in many examples
“the violations found entail crimes against humanity based on State policies” (UNGA,
2014, p. 6).

7

1.5 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 will present a review of pertinent
literature and outline existing theories of crimes against humanity. Chapter 3 will describe
the research methods including data collection, the case study approach, strategies used to
increase the validity and reliability of the study, and potential limitations to case study
methods. In Chapter 4, informed by criminological theories presented in Chapter 2, a case
study of North Korea is presented. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of
theoretical and policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Over the last several decades, criminologists have maintained an irregular
relationship with the study of large-scale criminal activity. Criminologists have
intermittently called for the expansion of disciplinary attention to this growing problem,
oftentimes during periods of emerging international crisis (Aviram, 2009; Barak, 1991;
Green & Ward, 2000; Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Maier-Katkin
et al., 2009; Matsueda, 2009; Savelsberg, 2009; Smeulers & Hola, 2009). During the last
decade, criminologists have shown increasing interest in theoretical explanations of CAH
(Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003; Hagan & Kaiser, 2011; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009;
Olusanya, 2013). Moreover, several notable criminologists, including two former
presidents of the American Society of Criminology, William Chambliss and John Hagan,
have increased the discipline’s attention to CAH while calling for the further
criminological exploration of these large-scale crimes.
2.1 LEGAL FORMULATION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The early formation of an international law concerning CAH rests partially on the
notion that natural laws—necessary rules determined by inherent human reason—are
superior to laws codified by the state (Dubler, 2008). Within the field of international law,
Hugo Grotius is credited with laying the groundwork for the codification of CAH when he
proclaimed that certain acts could “enormously violate the laws of nature and nations”
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(Grotius, 1925, as cited by Dubler, 2008). Grotius’s idea that certain crimes are
unacceptable is reflected in international law through the concept of jus cogens, which
dictates that certain obligations must be fulfilled by all states (Köchler, 2003). Adapted
from the legal concept of jus cogens, “universal jurisdiction” allows any recognized
international entity to hold criminal dominion over any accused person. A crime is
considered universal because the nature and gravity of the act would not be condoned by
any national government claiming legitimacy. As Dubler (2008) denotes, this precept led
to state intervention in the affairs of other states several times throughout history, but only
in extreme cases.1 Intervention in another state’s affairs based on natural laws suggested
that a majority of nations view these acts as unlawful, thus suggesting that the laws of
nature have maintained an influence on contemporary international law embedded in the
concept of jus cogens. Moreover, in 1966 the United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights recognized “the inherent dignity… and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family” (U.N.T.S., 1976, p. 172). Furthermore, Article 15(2) of the
covenant alludes to a “general principle of law recognized by the community of nations”
(U.N.T.S., 1976, p. 177). Although the Covenant was ratified by just 35 nations, this article
was later utilized as the foundation for prosecuting CAH in the Nuremburg trials.
This connection between international law and natural law is important because it
suggests that international violations of state sovereignty should ultimately serve to uphold
the ideals of natural law. Criminology may offer a fresh perspective on international
jurisprudence considering the discipline’s theoretical engagement with natural law

1

Some examples include the trial of Charles I in 1649, in which the Solicitor General John Cooke argued
that the king must still submit to the law and God, and Vietnam’s utilization of force to overthrow Pol Pot
(Dubler, 2008; Williams et al., 2012).
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principles and English common law. Still, the notion of CAH continues to evolve beyond
its original natural law influence.
Eventually, the positivist school of thought influenced the formation of
international law, further contributing to the jurisprudence of crimes against humanity. One
of positivism’s central tenets is that laws are valid because they are derived from logical
decisions made by authority. As such, authority will enact laws that preserve and protect
the society that legitimizes its power. From this logic, the biggest contribution of positivism
was the belief that civil interactions between countries is necessary for the maintenance of
peace. From this influence, the Nuremburg trials determined that under international law,
a crime against humanity must: (1) be considered a “universal crime,” that is— an act that
“shocks the conscience of humanity” and (2) must threaten international tranquility
(Dubler, 2008; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2012). The Nuremburg trials
were responsible for a broad expansion in the understanding of CAH, as well as the
concept’s codification.
The original definition of CAH was formulated during the Nuremburg Trials and
has since been modified by countless statutes, councils, charters, covenants, and tribunals.
However, as previously discussed, these crimes were not initially codified. Therefore, it
was important that laws and procedures were officially established to ensure the fairness
of the Nuremburg trials. As a result, the Nuremburg Charter of the International Military
Tribunal (1945) decreed that the Axis Powers could be tried for three specific crimes—
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Article 6(c) defined CAH
as:
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…murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal (Nuremburg, 1945).
Moreover, the Charter states that all losing countries could be tried even if the
crimes committed were not considered a violation of law within their own country. The
clear conceptualization and codification of CAH offered by the Nuremburg Charter was a
pivotal moment that provided recognition of these crimes, as well as a building block for
the formation of international institutions suitable to deal with such crimes. The general
study of this phenomenon stalled after the completion of the Nuremburg trials, due to the
fact that there “was a shortage of dictators accused of committing atrocities” (Dubler, 2008,
p. 96).
The end of the Nuremburg trials left the legal formulation of crimes against
humanity in a state of gridlock. The definition of these crimes had been expanded further
than ever before, but Nuremburg also set a precedent that these crimes were only
committed during times of war. This meant that only crimes committed before and during
war could be prosecuted, which limited the ability of nations to respond to atrocities based
on natural law or human rights arguments. Instead, the Nuremburg definition demanded
that the main goal of prosecuting these crimes should be the maintenance of international
peace through nonintervention (Dubler, 2008; UNGA, 1946). Still, the clarification offered
by the Nuremburg Trials was short-lived since the international community lacked an
accepted definition of “war.” Consequently, the grounds for prosecution of CAH
perpetrators narrowed and the study of these crimes experienced a lull until a resurgence
in the 1990s.
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International Institutions. The United Nations (UN) was commissioned by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt with its goal being to promote international peace and
cooperation. The UN Charter went into effect on October 24, 1945. Chapter VII of the
Charter dictates that the UN may take action in the presence of “any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and that the Security Council—a group of five
permanent member states with veto power and ten rotating member states, elected by all
member states for a two-year tenure—will determine whether or not to respond with
military action. Nonmilitary responses to international threats include “complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (U.N., 1945, p. 9).
However, as discussed above, a period of non-violence occurred following World War II
and as such, the UN would not become involved in international matters immediately.
Dubler (2008) notes that between 1992 and 1993, the UN evoked its Chapter VII
power in several conflicts including Angola, Haiti, Liberia, and Somalia. This sudden
upsurge of international conflict caused the UN Security Council to firmly respond to
accusations of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia with the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) — one of several entities established with the
“power to prosecute” those responsible for mass atrocities (U.N., 1945; U.N.S.C., 1993, p.
5). For the most part, the ICTY statutes defining CAH relied greatly on Article 6(c) of the
Nuremburg Charter that was outlined above. Therefore, CAH had to be linked to war in
order for the international community to interfere in another state’s sovereignty. This
presented a problem for the international community because no war had been officially
declared. Later developments would remove these restraints on nonintervention without a
13

declaration of war. However, simply establishing the ITCY was not enough to quell the
state sponsored violence. As a result, the magnitude of the violence in Yugoslavia
continued to not only imperiled the nation’s internal security, but also the peace of adjacent
countries. Hagan and his colleagues expand on the ineffectiveness of the ICTY:
…The Tribunal began in 1993 with little more than a U.N. Security Council
resolution and a handful of employees, with no sustaining budget, no building, no policing
mechanism, or personnel, and most notably, no detainees to place on trial (Hagan, Levi, &
Ferrales, 2014, p. 589).
The UN has since established other international bodies capable of prosecuting perpetrators
of crimes against humanity. The entities have been successful in drawing attention to
crimes against humanity and the perpetrators of such crimes.
In 1998, the Rome Conference established the International Criminal Court (ICC),
a permanent international criminal tribunal intended to be used as a last resort for the
prosecution of international crimes. The Conference consisted of 236 nongovernmental
organizations, 160 states, and 33 international organizations. Most notably, Article 7 of the
ICC statute redefined crimes against humanity (Mullins & Rothe, 2004). Rather than being
limited to acts committed only before and during war, the definition of crimes against
humanity was expanded to include all “attacks directed against any civilian population”
(UNGA, 1998, p.11). This definition expanded the study of CAH beyond the limited
purview of “war crimes.” The ICC statute declares that these attacks should be in
accordance with state or organizational policy and, in doing so, acknowledges that the state
and its actors can be held responsible for committing crimes against humanity.
While the definition has continued to evolve over time, the main sentiment has
remained the same—crimes against humanity are “particularly odious offenses in that they
14

constitute a serious attack on human dignity or grave humiliation or a degradation of human
beings” (Horton, 2005, p. 201). Although this thesis examines the North Korean regime as
a state perpetrator of crimes against humanity, it is important to understand that not all
crimes against humanity are committed by the state or state-sponsored actors. Throughout
history, these atrocities have also been executed by political and religious radical groups
(Dubler, 2008).
Over the years, as state crime has increasingly become the subject of criminological
inquiry, research has focused on global financial crimes, genocide, and CAH (Friedrichs
& Friedrichs, 2002; Friedrichs, 2009; Hagan & Kaiser, 2011; Hagan & RymondRichmond, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Matsueda, 2009). However,
considerably less attention has been given to crimes against humanity. Traditionally,
genocide and crimes against humanity have been treated as separate legal concepts,
although recognition of this distinction is not universal (Harff, Marshall, & Gurr, 2005;
Harff, 1995). Murder as a crime against humanity, involves the “widespread and
systematic” killing of a significant number of individuals. On the other hand, murder as
genocide seeks the complete eradication of a specific cultural or ethnic group (Dubler,
2008; Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Williams et al., 2012). While the motives
behind these crimes may differ, they find common ground in their systematic, large-scale
nature. Therefore, this thesis conceptualizes “crimes against humanity” as large-scale
crimes, including genocide, which are “wide-spread and systematic.”
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2.2 CRIMINOLOGY AND STATE CRIME
Can “the state” commit a crime? In 1964, Austin Turk challenged scholars to widen
their scope of study and to push the boundaries of the definition of crime. He encouraged
the “conceptualization of criminology as a scientific instead of an ‘applied’ discipline”
(Turk, 1964, p. 454). Additionally, in a Presidential Address to the American Society of
Criminology, William Chambliss called upon criminologists to specifically explore statesponsored crime (Chambliss, 1988). Chambliss suggested that criminologist must agree on
a definition of crime that allows for the maintenance and growth of the discipline, sparking
a debate over whether or not criminology has a place in the discussion of state crime. The
conceptualization and definitional issues raised by Chambliss continue to be debated in
recent scholarship (Cohen, 1990; Green & Ward, 2000; Rothe & Friedrichs, 2006).
The very notion of examining state-sponsored CAH through a criminological lens
is controversial in and of itself. Opponents of criminological assessments of state crime
hinge their arguments on the notion that a “state” is incapable of committing crime. These
scholars argue that criminal law does not apply to the state, as the state is the entity that
enforces and legitimizes the law (Cohen, 1990; Green & Ward, 2000). However, Rothe
and Friedrichs (2006) address this claim using Schwendinger and Schwendinger’s (1970)
suggestion that crime could also be measured by society using the concept of human rights
whereby any violation of human rights is considered criminal. This rebuttal is pertinent
considering criminology’s familiarity with human rights. However, more simplistic
explanations exist. As Hagan notes, the Nuremburg trials established a precedent in
international law which has been utilized to bring claims of CAH violations against
multiple people and countries (Hagan et al., 2005; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). As outlined
16

above, the UN has introduced several new bodies capable of prosecuting perpetrators of
CAH, most notably the International Criminal Court. The establishment of international
courts has provided a legitimate means of holding “the state” culpable for CAH.
In 2005, Kramer and Michalowski proposed a synthesized definition:
State crime is any action that violates public international law, international
criminal law, or domestic law when these actions are committed by individuals acting in
official or covert capacity as agents of the state pursuant to expressed or implied orders of
the state, or resulting from state failure to exercise due diligence over the actions of its
agents. (p. 2)
This definition links the international laws regarding CAH and the criminological concept
of state crime by regarding such crime as a violation of “public international law,
international criminal law, or domestic law.” Thus, “state crime” is defined to include
crimes against humanity committed by the state or state actors in pursuance of state
policies. The next section reviews relevant empirical scholarship on state-sponsored crimes
against humanity.
2.3 CRIMINOLOGY OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
To date, scholars concerned with the criminology of state-sponsored CAH have
centered their analyses on specific crimes defined by international law. International law
recognizes state-perpetrated war crimes, genocides, and crimes against humanity as
separate concepts differentiated by intent. Although the impetus behind these statesponsored crimes may differ, their means and ends are very much the same. This thesis,
therefore, adopts a broad definition of state-sponsored crimes against humanity, of which
war crimes and crimes of genocide are considered special cases. In other words, this thesis
will consider state-sponsored crimes against humanity to include any perpetration of
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“widespread and systematic” crime that “shocks the conscience of humanity” in adherence
to or as a result of state policies.
This approach is consistent with Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) as they note how
the UN definitions that influence international laws are oftentimes “developed in a highly
politicized context” and, as such, they consider all instances of large-scale mass murders
of innocent noncombatants in their scope of inquiry. According to their analysis,
generalizing international laws regarding state-sponsored crimes will allow criminologists
to study the concept of state crime without the “limitations of actus reus” (i.e., a guilty act)
given that the crime is considered universal (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003, p. 110).
Criminologists’ circumscribed approach to state crimes might first be expanded through
the application of existing theories. A deeper understanding of “widespread and
systematic” crime not only has theoretical implications, but has practical applications for
improving the functioning and operation of the international criminal justice system.
Furthermore, Brannigan and Hardwick (2003), influenced by Gottfredson and
Hirschi’s A General Theory of Crime (1990), advocate utilizing a “broad or general scope”
when analyzing CAH. Thus, they outline seven “hard facts” about genocide and CAH: (1)
there is a pre-existing group conflict, (2) perpetrators are ordinary people working as a
group towards some perceived higher purpose, (3) perpetrators utilize techniques of
neutralization, (4) the state perpetuates group conflict, (5) the victims are defenseless, (6)
deaths must be “considerable,” and (7) genocide can be deterred. Brannigan and Hardwick
illustrate these hard facts using examples found in the genocides of Bosnia and Rwanda.
Some scholars view these “hard facts” as irrelevant or unrelated to Gottfredson and
Hirschi’s general theory (Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). However, Brannigan and Hardwick
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note that they use the term “general theory” in a much broader sense than was ever intended
by Gottfredson and Hirschi. Instead of challenging the ideas of Gottfredson and Hirschi,
they wish for their theory to be considered separate from, although largely influenced by,
self-control theory.
The individual-level analysis proposed by Brannigan and Hardwick poses no
problem for the explanation of group action. As they point out, Gottfresdson and Hirschi
(1990) have already addressed this issue, arguing that at the heart of collective action is the
action of multiple individuals (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003). Although they explore
genocide through the lens of an individual-level theory, their conclusion suggests that the
state is capable of encouraging genocide through similar mechanisms traditionally linked
to low self-control (e.g., ineffective parenting techniques). These common threads propose
that state crimes such as genocide could be the product of inculcated ideologies—
suggesting the utility of exploring state-sponsored crimes against humanity from a life
course perspective that emphasizes self-control and social bonds (Elder & Rockwell,
1979).
Maier-Katkin and his colleagues offer a comprehensive criminological theory in
their article “Towards a Criminology of Crimes Against Humanity” (Maier-Katkin et al.,
2009). The six contentions delineated by Maier-Katkin et al. are contingent upon one
another and lay the groundwork for a theory of CAH. Proposition 1 contends that as a “precondition” to the occurrence of these crimes, a society experiences intense and widespread
strain. Further, they hold that the deeper and more prevalent strain is within a society, the
more likely CAH will occur. Proposition 2 holds that in the presence of societal strain,
individual-level fears increase, causing individuals to form into identifiable groups.
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Proposition 3 states that these individuals then begin to internalize the norms of their
groups in order to combat the feelings of fear experienced by the breakdown of society.
They refer to this phenomenon as group socialization. Next, Proposition 4 notes that group
socialization contributes to the structure of a group, increasing its ability to function
successfully. Proposition 5 states that CAH are more likely to occur in groups whose
dynamics are grounded in dehumanization, violence, and self-interest. Finally, Proposition
6 holds that as per Propositions 1-5, violent acts will likely ensue against non-threatening
groups, especially in cases where the true source of strain is not susceptible to attack.
From these six propositions, the authors draw several generalizations concerning
why individuals participate in crimes against humanity. First, they concede that the
occurrence of CAH is the result of a multitude of events occurring simultaneously,
including “societal, local community, group level, and individual level factors” (MaierKatkin et al., 2009, p. 248). Next, they highlight the important role self-interest plays in
the occurrence of CAH. They contend that groups take violent actions in order to protect
themselves from becoming the target of such actions. Finally, they acknowledge that their
theory is preliminary and subject to revision.
Maier-Katkin et al. (2009) provide a case study of Jedwabne, Poland as a backdrop
for theoretical exposition. For example, shortly after the Nazi’s gained control of Poland,
Polish civilians began to turn on their Jewish neighbors resulting in a slaughter of Jewish
people living in the town. Local Polish civilians even traveled to town to witness the
killings. Based on their examination of the Jedwabne killings, Maier-Katkin et al (2009)
suggest that the causes of criminal activity derive from two sets of factors: individual
characteristics (micro) and social conditions (macro). Next, they argue that individual-level
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theories cannot fully explain crimes against humanity because these theories tend to ignore
social context and, as we have learned, social context is critical to understanding human
behavior. This sentiment has been exposited during several other discussions of criminality
(Browning, 1993; Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983; Olusanya, 2013; Zimbardo, 2007;
Zimbardo et al., 1971). Maier-Katkin and colleagues thus eschew solely individual-based
explanations because they do not account for the important role that social context plays in
state crime. Maier-Katkin et al. (2009) offers an important insight into the contributing
social factors of CAH, as well as the overall understanding of state-sponsored crimes.
Although they largely criticize Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) for exploring these crimes
through individual-level theory, the propositions outlined by Maier-Kaktin and colleagues’
group-level analysis are strikingly similar to Brannigan and Hardwick’s “seven hard facts,”
providing some support for Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) claim that, in the end,
collective action is comprised of individual actions.
Many scholars have considered the notion that perpetrators of CAH to be normal
people who were simply following orders or striving to achieve their own personal goals.
For example, Browning (1993) explores this popular theory in his book Ordinary Men,
which examines how an average group of middle-aged policemen initiated one of the
largest recognized genocides in history—the holocaust. Browning writes that:
Within virtually every social collective, the peer group exerts tremendous pressures
on behavior and sets moral norms. If the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become
killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot? (p. 189).
This concept has been studied in the field of criminology for some time, best exemplified
by Phillip Zimbardo’s classic prison experiment on power and social control, which placed
undergraduate volunteers in the roles of guards and inmates. Ultimately, the experiment
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had to be stopped after ordinary college students transformed into “perpetrators of evil”
(Zimbardo, 2007; Zimbardo et al., 1971). Zimbardo concluded that this was due to the
internalization of the roles that had been assigned. For example, although the roles of guard
and prisoner were assigned at random, the guards did not allow prisoners to empty their
sanitation buckets, which served as their restroom; in other cases, guards would place
inmates in a dark closet as a form of solitary confinement (Zimbardo et al., 1971, p. 7).
Both Browning’s and Zimbardo’s work suggests that human behavior is highly dependent
on context—a theme that is present in many criminological theories (e.g., social
disorganization, institutional anomie, broken windows, social learning, self-control).
Moreover, these concepts are also present in the analysis of CAH provided by Brannigan
and Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al (2009). Figure 2.1 provides a synthesized
outline of the major points presented by both theories. Overall, Maier-Katkin’s (2009)
organizational structure is utilized, while Brannigan & Hardwick’s (italicized) (2003)
contentions are used to clarify and expand on the theoretical propositions outlined by
Maier-Katkin.
Many theorists continue to recognize the influential role of social context.
Additionally, some criminologists have acknowledged the importance of examining CAH
on the micro- and macro-levels and continue to develop new approaches to explaining
large-scale criminality. For example, John Hagan has conducted a criminological
exploration of genocide that appeals to mainstream criminologists through his quantitative
studies of genocide in Darfur (Hoffman, 2009; Matsueda, 2009). Hagan’s (2008) book on
Darfur and the Crime of Genocide has garnered considerable attention in criminology.
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Widespread fear results in the
deterioriation of conventional
social bonds leading to the
formation of NEW PRIMARY
GROUP AFFILIATIONS built
around an "us versus them"
mentality. This mentality
encourages individuals to form
groups with people who share
similar beliefs. PRIMARY
GROUP SOCIALIZATION
legitimizes group actions, which
clouds culpability-- this is espcially
true for structured groups that
value obedience.

INTENSE, WIDESPREAD
STRAIN occurs on a social and
individual level as a precursor to
CAH. Intensity and prevalence of
strain will determine the
likelyhood that CAH will ensue.
Strain produces high levels of
fear. Certain events are easily
identifiable as strain (i.e. war,
famine, economic depression),
because these events threaten
personal security and demarcates
indidviduals.

The GROUP STRUCTURE AND
DYNAMICS of the new primary
group structure are influenced by the
intensity and prevalence of strain as
well as the diffusion of socialization
into social roles. Group structure
determines authority and law
systems. Authority and law systems
influence the availability of social
roles. CAH are more likely to occur
when "ordinary" individuals
subscribe to the new social roles
assigned to them by the authority
system. Following the formation of
new primary group structures, normal
group processes of socialization and
conformity ensue.

CAH are more likley to occur in
groups whose BELIEF
SYSTEMS encourage values
often associated with immediate
self-interest, dehumanization and
violence. These beliefs are
legitimized through group action.
Moreover, authority and law
systems will play a role in the
dispersion and socialization of
primary group beliefs.

This process will likely result in
the DISPLACEMENT OF
AGGRESSION. Primary group
structure, group action, group
dynamics, and group beliefs will
encourge the use of violence,
which will oftentimes be directed
at unguarded targets.

Figure 2.1 Synthesized Theoretical Outline
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Using the same methodological approach implemented in his 2005 Criminology article,
Hagan’s book utilizes data from the 2004 Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) which
was conducted by the U.S. State Department (Hagan et al., 2005). The ADS surveyed 1136
Darfur refugees that had been placed in United Nations Displacement Camps.
Hagan’s work takes a case study approach to the exploration of genocide by
recording individual accounts of state violations of international law in Darfur, highlighting
the importance of gathering the accounts of multiple witnesses when studying crimes on
such a large-scale level (Moon, 2011). Recall that Turk also asserted the importance of
individual perceptions of crimes (Turk, 1964). Hagan’s work has been extended with
colleagues in several articles on the genocide in Darfur during the last decade. He has
examined the inadequate response of the United States to the Rwandan genocide, the effect
of this failure on current responses to the genocide in Darfur, the link between the US war
on terror and the genocide in Darfur, a quantitative approach to proving genocidal intent,
the efficiency and sustainability of the ICC, the social construction of administrative
entities like the ITCY, and the unique ways in which international law is formed through
the networking of these organizations (Hagan & Kaiser, 2011; Hagan et al., 2014, 2005;
Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009). His work is responsible for engendering wider
criminological attention into state crimes of genocide.
His book alone produced four reviews from scholars published in Theoretical
Criminology in 2009, as well as a reply from Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond
(Aviram, 2009; Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Matsueda, 2009;
Savelsberg, 2009). Hagan’s book further explores his utilization of the ADS data to prove
the genocidal intent of state-led Arabs Muslims against their African Muslims neighbors.
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Additionally, Hagan’s work draws attention to international criminal tribunals (ICT) and
the ICC. Specifically, in his most recent work he teams up with Ron Levi and Gabrielle
Ferrales to examine the ICT established in Darfur (Hagan et al., 2014). They emphasize
that the legal formulation of state crimes was heavily influenced by the decisions and
actions of these international institutions, rather than legislative bodies. They further
explore the increasing politicization of the international criminal justice system, noting the
relevant connections to conflict theory—emphasizing the extreme political nature of the
international criminal justice system (Hagan et al., 2014). This is a logical connection
considering that the codification of crimes like genocide were the result of the World War
II victors influence on international legal concepts. The politicization of the international
justice system further supports the argument that social context affects the likelihood that
CAH will occur. Hagan’s work stands as an important contribution to the field, especially
when considering the policy implications of CAH research.
The effectiveness of intervention relies heavily on the ability of these international
institutions to hold perpetrators accountable; however, more study is needed on conditions
that lead to the emergence of ICTs in order to strengthen their responses (Hagan & Kaiser,
2011; Hagan et al., 2014; Hola, Bijleveld, & Smeulers, 2011). Many scholars encourage
the study of these international organizations in hopes that improving their functioning will
lead to a permanent place for them in the international criminal justice system (Hagan et
al., 2014; Hola, Bijleveld, & Smeulers, 2011; Moon, 2011). In an attempt to achieve this,
Hagan and his colleagues explore the recent push to make institutions like the International
Criminal Court permanent. Much like the American criminal justice system, the
international system is divided on many critical issues. Debate on this issue has
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underscored the influence of international political agendas on ICTs, specifically their
definitions and enforcement of state crimes (Fouzder, 2011; Hagan et al., 2014).
Hagan’s examination of genocide in Darfur has clearly highlighted the importance
of understanding the origins of these criminal regimes, which can help to inform ICTs of
the potential warning signs of large-scale, systematic crime and determine the most
effective way to hold perpetrators accountable for CAH. This thesis seeks to expand the
application of general criminological theories to the study of state crime and promote a
more thorough understanding of the origins of these types of crimes. Due to the extreme
nature of CAH cases, a broader understanding of this phenomenon has the potential to
improve the functionality of the international criminal justice system.
As discussed above, there has been some debate in criminology as to whether or
not individual-level explanations of crime can aid the exploration of state crime.
Examination of the relevant literature on state crime suggests that a combination of
individual and group-level theories would aid our understanding of state crime (Brannigan
& Hardwick, 2003; Hagan et al., 2014; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Olusanya, 2013). In part,
this is largely due to the complex nature of international relations. Despite this complexity,
initial examinations of CAH have produced similar theoretical propositions. Both
Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al (2009) present their theories as a set
of sequential events that must occur in order for CAH violations to ensue, whereas Hagan
and colleagues highlight the volatile nature of the current international justice system and
suggest that social context will largely influence the effectiveness of CAH policies and
punishment. Therefore, this case study will apply these theoretical orientations to an
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investigation of the individual and social conditions that influence the perpetration of
crimes against humanity in North Korea.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
3.1 CASE STUDY METHOD
Methodologically, this thesis relies on case study methods in order to determine the
extent to which current theories explain CAH violations in NK. This method relies on the
systematic collection and analysis of multiple data sources. Beyond the use of multiple data
sources, Yin (2014) identifies several other key factors that maintain the validity and
reliability of case study findings: (1) establish a chain of evidence, (2) build upon existing
explanations, (3) address rival explanations, (4) use logic models to match empirical
observations to theoretical predictions, (5) use theory in single case studies, and (6) develop
a case study database. These strategies have been implemented throughout the research
design, data collection, and data analysis stages of this thesis.
3.2 CASE STUDY METHOD FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Taking a qualitative approach to state crime requires the application of a structured
research method. Case study methods have been utilized in this research to highlight
patterns, emphasize relationships between variables, draw comparisons, and to encourage
conceptual/theoretical consistency through the construction of a logical chain of evidence.
Specifically, these methods have shaped the design of this study by supplying a stable
framework to analyze CAH committed in NK. A holistic, single-case study method was
chosen because this type of examination can add to the knowledge base of state crime by
28

“contributing, challenging, or extending theory” and can help organize information to
identify related subunits for future research designs (Yin, 2014, p. 51). Therefore, this
method is extremely useful for exploring new phenomena.
With recent evidence increasingly confirming that North Korean government
officials are responsible for long-running CAH violations against the civilian population
(UNGA, 2014), NK provides the unique opportunity to examine a case of CAH. The UN
Commission of Inquiry (COI) on human rights in NK has labeled these violations
“unspeakable” (UNGA, 2014). Therefore, NK provides an extreme platform for exploring
the generality of CAH theories.
3.3 SOURCE OF DATA
The study of NK presents a particularly difficult challenge because access to the
country is strictly controlled by the government and oversight by outside monitors is very
limited. Consequently, secondary data is the primary source of evidence for this study. To
reduce threats to validity, the study’s data were obtained from multiple sources, including
existing historical literature, UN Commission reports, and the COI interviews of
eyewitnesses and victims (Yin, 2014). Supplementary data sources include video of the
interviews conducted by the UN and government records. Specific examples of documents
used in this research are listed in Table 3.1 below. Yin (2014) argues that the triangulation
of multiple data sources should be utilized to increase validity. These data sources were
analyzed for points of convergence to assess the nature and extent of CAH violations in
NK, how these crimes continue to occur despite international pressure, and how the
international community can improve the efficacy of its response. The qualitative analysis
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Table 3.1 Data Sources
Data Type
Interviews

Examples
Conducted by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Interviews record the eye witness testimony of 80 people including
former prison camp guards and prisoners, and previous supporters of
the Kim regime

Historical
Information

Scholarly publications from historians specializing in Korean and
Asian affairs

Government
Records

USSR records concerning the Korean War and Korean relations

United
Nations
Commission
Reports

Question and answer sessions regarding the conditions of North
Korea with the commissioner, Mr. Michael Kirby

Video

Footage of the interviews conducted by the UN Commission

US records on the Korean War

program Dedoose was used as the analytic platform for conducting this study. Dedoose
helped to organize a “case study database” in which text is coded for the purpose of
developing and connecting common themes across multiple sources.
3.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR METHODS
Case study research has long been associated with the study of state crimes
(Browning, 1993; Fouzder, 2011; Friedrichs & Friedrichs, 2002; Hagan & Kaiser, 2011;
Hagan et al., 2005; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). Case study research is best utilized to convey
an understanding of a complex subject. Additionally, these methods can expand knowledge
and evaluate what has already been theorized in previous research. The international
criminal justice system is relatively new, and while the ICTs and the ICC have established
definitions for crimes like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, we still
30

require comprehensive understanding of the etiology and course of these crimes. The
detailed examination of specific examples of these types of violations will allow us to
uncover “analytical generalizations” that will facilitate the study of state crimes (Yin,
2014).
3.5 CODING
This case study examines the historical and political developments of North Korea
and aims to outline the impact of these developments on North Korean civilian and
government involvement in CAH. Furthermore, this case study facilitates the examination
of specific examples of CAH violations in NK through the lens of existing theories of CAH
articulated by Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al. (2009). Even more,
this thesis aims to distinguish specific factors that facilitate the increase of crimes against
humanity in North Korea and will explore these concepts from both macro- and microlevels. Sources from multiple decades were analyzed using Dedoose in order to identify
policies and patterns throughout North Korean history.
A review of the existing literature has suggested that strain, self-control, and social
bonds will be helpful in guiding my analysis of crimes against humanity (Brannigan &
Hardwick, 2003; Browning, 1993; Hagan & Kaiser, 2011; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009;
Mullins & Rothe, 2004; Sampson, 2005). As such, codes for each theory were created. The
codes include: intense, widespread strain, new primary group affiliations, primary group
socialization, group structure, group dynamics, system beliefs, and displacement of
aggression.
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CHAPTER 4
A CASE STUDY: NORTH KOREA
Testimonies recorded by the UN’s COI suggest that some CAH violations have
been occurring in NK starting as early as 1958. However, the commission has only recently
investigated claims of violations. Information about the type of crimes facilitated by the
North Korean government is limited. One explanation for this is offered by former political
prisoner, Kim Young-Soon. She discusses how it took many years for the Korean people
to become dissatisfied with the policies of the Kim family and even more time before they
were willing to speak out against them, stating that “We [North Koreans] speak what is
written in the script, that’s the North Korean society” (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013,
p. 17). This is one possible reason that it has taken so long for the international community
to acknowledge these atrocities. Only recently has the UN’s COI has been able to retrieve
more information on the current human rights situation in North Korea.
In February 2014 the COI officially concluded that crimes against humanity
violations are occurring in NK. The COI was able to draw this conclusion based on the
testimony of over 80 first-hand accounts of CAH in NK as well as expert testimony.
Interviews were conducted by all members of the Commission in a transparent public
setting. By the end of its investigation the COI had conducted more than 240 interviews
consisting of eye-witness and expert testimony. North Korea officials have maintained that
the testimony heard by the Commission is false testimony provided by “fugitives” and
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“terrorists” adding that the COI’s report is “steeped in selectivity and double standard by
gathering one-sided materials devoid of scientific accuracy and objectivity in content”
(“Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies,” 2014, pp. 12–13).
However, the UN contends that there is no incentive for false testimony against NK. Many
witnesses, although living outside of the borders of NK, continued to fear reprisal (Kirby,
Biserko, & Darusman, 2013e, 2013k, 2013m). Some witnesses chose not to participate
based on this fear, which even the assurance of confidentiality could not overcome (UNGA,
2014). Additionally, satellite imagery was utilized to corroborate testimony given by
interviewees in regards to prison camp locations and the triangulation of sources was used
to increase the validity and reliability of the Commission’s report. Between 2013 and 2014
the COI conducted interviews in Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Washington, DC. The COI
invited NK to send a representative to each of the proceedings, however NK did not
respond to this offer. The CAH theories articulated by Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and
Maier-Katkin et al (2009) were summarized above in Figure 2.1. Can these theories help
explain the manifestation of crimes against humanity in North Korea?
4.1 INTENSE, WIDESPREAD STRAIN
Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory has long held that criminal behavior is more
likely in environments that contain multiple sources of intense, widespread strain.
Following Agnew’s logic, both Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al.
(2009) highlight the critical role of strain in CAH—contending that pre-existing
widespread strain is a catalyst for large-scale criminality. Strain can arise from many
sources such as racial tension, religious intolerance, political differences, and economic
crisis to name a few. Maier-Katkin et al (2009) acknowledge that strain is dynamic and,
33

furthermore, strain itself is not sufficient to produce CAH. However, intense strain is the
first identifiable precursor to CAH violations. As Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) suggest,
certain situations produce intense strain on a large-scale (i.e. colonization, war, economic
depression). Examples of strain in the case of NK can be categorized on two levels—macro
(social) and micro (individual). In the case of North Korea, large-scale societal strain
encouraged widespread individual strain.
North Korea’s history contains several clear instances of long-running, social
strain. The conclusion of World War II brought the end of Japanese imperialism in Korea.
Burdened by seven decades of Japanese rule, the Korean people had long been hopeful for
a free Korea (Armstrong, 2005; A. Kim, 1970). This sentiment has recently been reinforced
in a report issued by North Korea's Association for Human Rights Studies, in which life
under Japanese rule was branded as “miserable,” adding that,
Each and every law instituted by Japan for governance of Korea in the past was
unprecedentedly evil, anti-human rights laws aimed at depriving the Korean people of all
their political freedom and rights and forcing colonial slavery upon them (“Report of the
DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies,” 2014, p. 14)
In addition, towards the end of Japanese imperialism, the socioeconomic conditions in
Korea were extremely unstable. As such, in 1945 the people of North Korea welcomed
Soviet forces into their country and believed that the USSR would be able to help NK hold
elections in order to secure sovereignty (G.-D. Kim, 1990).
Scholars believe that a consequence of Japanese imperialism in Korea was a
population “ripe for radicalization” (Gills, 1992, p. 108). The interpretation that intense,
widespread strain would be subsequently followed by the deterioration of Japaneseinfluenced group structures, allowing for the emergence and acceptance of USSR34

influenced group structures is consistent with ideas propositioned by Maier-Katkin et al
(2009). Furthermore, CAH violations are more likely to occur when new primary group
affiliations are premised on non-conventional belief systems (Brannigan & Hardwick,
2003; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). Although intense, widespread strain had been
experienced by the Korean people for years prior to 1945, no known CAH violations were
committed. One explanation might be that CAH under Japanese imperialism were never
recorded or reported. This is probable considering that CAH were not even defined until
after World War II.
Following World War II, international tensions remained high with the emergence
of the Cold War. In an attempt to avoid providing either the USSR or the US with complete
influence over Korea, the country was divided. Charged with overseeing Korean elections,
President Roosevelt and Russian President Joseph Stalin agreed upon a trusteeship2 plan
for Korea (G.-D. Kim, 1990). Korea was divided geographically at the 38th parallel,
forming North and South Korea. North Korea was heavily influenced by the USSR and
China, while South Korea was influenced by the US and the UN (Lankov, 1960; Millett,
2001; Rudolph, 1959). As a result, in the coming years these new nations would be further
divided by ideology. On another level, the division of Korea was a deep source of strain
for many individuals across the nation. Many families were physically separated by the
division and Cold War tensions impeded travel and communication across the 38th parallel
(Foley, 2003; Paik, 1995).

2

The International Trusteeship System was established in Chapter XII of the UN Charter. The program was
used as a mechanism to provide supervision for territories that were detached from “enemy states” as a
result of World War II (U.N., 1945, p. 15)
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The nature of the Cold War exaggerated the value of international influence.
Therefore, following the establishment of trusteeship, North and South Korea became
pawns in the Cold War between the US and the USSR (A. Kim, 1970; Millett, 2001;
Rudolph, 1959; Yang, 1980). The Soviets hoped to maintain and spread Communism
further throughout Asia while the US hoped to gain Asian allies in order to contain
Communism. Although despite their place in the middle of the Cold War, between 1945
and 1950, NK experienced a period of political and economic stability. However, North
Korea’s stability was dependent upon Soviet aid. In fact, Soviet support would play a
crucial role in the economic stability of North Korea for many years (Chung, 1983; Eugene
Kim, 1985; Lankov, 1960; Paik, 1995). As scholar Alexander Kim reports, “The total value
of Soviet economic assistance to North Korea from the beginning of 1946 to the end of
1950 is estimated at $546,000,000” (1970, p.241). By 1959, Soviet aid was responsible for
the majority of North Korean industrial production (Armstrong, 2005). Further, the Library
of Congress estimates that North Korea accepted close to US$4.75 billion in foreign aid
between 1946 and 1986—with almost 46% of this coming from the USSR (As cited by
Cumings et al, 1993). Soviet assistance facilitated the vast improvement of NK’s
socioeconomic situation between 1945 and 1950. In addition, the USSR guided the
political structure of the North Korean government. Mirroring Soviet political structure,
the majority of political power in 1950s NK was derived from the controlling political
party.
While the trusteeship solution assisted the social reconstruction of NK in many
ways, it also set the stage for civil unrest in Korea by dividing the country between the two
philosophies of Communism and Capitalism. The competing ideologies of the USSR and
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the US made it difficult for the nations to come to any form of agreement concerning
Korean elections. The failure of the USSR and the US to host Korean elections squashed
hopes for the reunification of Korea. Moreover, the economic crutch provided by the USSR
was not enough to quell North Korea’s dissolution of political and social bonds formed
with the USSR. Thus, on the social level, the blocked goal of reunification on the Korean
peninsula had important implications for the future of Korean politics.
Additionally, social level strain created by the numerous blocked reunification
attempts encouraged the reorganization of primary group affiliations by emphasizing the
ideological differences between the Soviet objectives and those of the Korean people (A.
Kim, 1970). This divergence can be illustrated by the political shift experienced in NK
during the late 1950s. As the Soviet-North Korean bond began to deteriorate, two distinct
groups emerged among North Korean government officials—one in favor of the USSR’s
political control in NK and the other in favor of asserting more Korean control in politics
(Eugene Kim, 1985; Lankov, 1960; Yang, 1980). The Soviets implemented several
strategies aimed at maintaining control of North Korea. Kim (1970) notes that in an attempt
to preserve control over the country, the USSR implemented several tactics: (1) they placed
Soviet-born Koreans (who were also members of the Soviet Communist Party) in key
positions of the government and military, (2) they ensured that Kim Il-Sung and his
followers relied on support from these Soviet Koreans to maintain his influence, and (3)
they ensured that North Korea was dependent on the USSR for economic and military
assistance. These three core tactics have been recognized by many historians as integral to
the maintenance of Soviet control in North Korea’s early years (Armstrong, 2005; Eugene
Kim, 1985; Gills, 1992; Koh, 1970; Suh, 1973). Despite the use of these tactics, Kim Il37

Sung began to emerge as an independent political favorite (Eugene Kim, 1985; A. Kim,
1970; Suh, 1973). Kim was already well-known in Korea for his participation in anti-Japan
guerilla assaults in Manchuria, China during the 1930s, and Kim utilized this political
popularity to encourage the invasion of South Korea for purposes of reunification (Yang,
1980).
The Korean War (1950-1953). The Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea
(with Soviet support) attempted to invade and overtake South Korea with the goal of
reunification. The Korean War affected NK’s political situation as well as its citizens
directly. Brannigan & Hardwick recognize war as an easily identifiable conductor of strain
because of the obvious effects of death and destruction. War also begins the process of
dividing individuals into groups based on their beliefs. The War took place on the Korean
home front. Therefore, from 1950-1953, Korean civilians experienced the death and
destruction of war. American air raids during the War succeeded in demolishing NK’s
infrastructure (Millett, 2001). Furthermore, the War failed to unite Korea again. By the end
of the War some Korean families had been separated for more than seven years.
The Korean War represents the first time in which the interests of the USSR
considerably differed from the interests of North Korea. As such, the Korean War might
be considered the catalyst by which the majority of North Koreans began to form new
primary group affiliations. This sentiment is expressed by Japanese scholar, Kato Hiroshi,
during his testimony to the Commission. He said:
The greatest issue from my opinion is that between 1950 and 1953 during the
Korean War, the North Korean capital was reduced to ashes and the war had killed a total
of 3 to 4 million people and also caused 10 million families to split up. I think that is the
true root cause and the starting point (Hiroshi as cited in Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 2).
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The Korean War was extremely violent. At one point during the NK occupation of the
South Korean capital Seoul, around 93,000 South Koreans and 7,000 Japanese were
abducted and “returned” to North Korea (Hiroshi as cited in Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 2). For
the USSR and the US, the War no longer made sense economically. An armistice
agreement between the USSR and the US ended the Korean War in 1953. By the end of
the War, the socioeconomic situation in NK was severely unstable (Armstrong, 2005;
Mercer, 2013; Millett, 2001). The USSR’s agreement with the US also ended North
Korea’s push for reunification. Kim Il-Sung and many of his supporters disagreed with the
USSR’s decision to abruptly end the Korean War without victory (Gills, 1992; Lankov,
1960). The abrupt end to the War encouraged a power shift in favor of Kim Il-Sung and,
as such, remains a major turning point in the history of North Korea.
By the end of the Korean War in 1953, the international community had just begun
to consider the development of an international justice system. As a result, there was no
ICT or any other special court established to investigate the post-War situation in NK. A
civil war occurring in any country should have been enough to garner international
attention. Civil war especially exacerbates the likelihood of crimes against humanity
violations because the parties involved are often within close range of each other allowing
for more opportunity to commit crime and providing more suitable targets for crime
(Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). However, the international
criminal justice system was ill-equipped at the time to handle Korea’s situation.
This analysis indicates that intense, widespread strain was experienced in NK for
many years prior to the takeover of the Kim Il-Sung regime. Examples of social strain
discussed include imperialism, political instability, economic dependence, blocked
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reunification efforts, and the destruction of war. Additionally the Korean War produced
individual strain, such as the separation of family members during the Korean division and
the emotional impact of the war. After decades of intense strain, any entity that challenged
the North Korean goals of reunification and independence became an opponent to the State.
Thus far, the case of North Korea is consistent with the analyses of Brannigan &
Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al (2009). Prior to an outbreak of CAH violations,
NK experienced a series of events that produced intense, widespread strain which
“demarcate[d] the opponents and put them into a state of preexisting conflict and/or
animosity” (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003, p. 118). North Korea would eventually respond
to this strain with the formation of new primary group affiliations, structures, and beliefs
instituted by Kim Il-Sung and his followers. Kim’s new group structure and beliefs gained
popularity, uniting North Koreans under the common ideology of Korean Nationalism and
the common goal of a unified Korea. The unique strain experienced by individuals in NK
in combination with the influence of communism resulted in a population whose values
coincided with the values of their authority system.
4.2 PRIMARY GROUP AFFILIATIONS AND SOCIALIZATION
Primary Group Affiliations. According to the theoretical outline established in
Figure 2.1, periods of intense, widespread strain will be subsequently followed by the
deterioration of old social bonds and the emergence of new primary group affiliations.
Maier-Katkin et al. explicitly states that fear and self-interest are the driving forces behind
the formation of new primary group affiliations. Moreover, these new group structures
often rely on an “us versus them” mentality (Maier-Katkin et al., 2009, p. 241).
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The Korean War wreaked havoc on socioeconomic conditions in North Korea, and
many prominent North Korean’s blamed post-war conditions on the USSR (Yang, 1980).
Consequently, the USSR was now viewed as an opponent to North Korean goals creating
an “us versus them” mentality. This mentality encouraged Kim’s rise to power. Evidence
for this can be seen in the 1956 restructuring of NK’s leading political party, the Korean
Worker’s Party (KWP). Kim successfully purged the Party of Soviet supporters and
secured his internal power base (A. Kim, 1970; Lankov, 1960). Kim began to sever ties
with Soviet political policies and began to support North Korean “self-reliance” as a means
of strengthening local industries and assuring access to everyday necessities for the North
Korean people (Armstrong, 2005). Foreign economic support nevertheless continued to
play a significant role in the reconstruction of NK. The communist countries of Eastern
Europe, along with the USSR and China, united to aid in the reconstruction of North Korea
as a sign of “international socialist solidarity” (Armstrong, 2005, p. 162). North Korea’s
economic situation improved rapidly as a result of this collective foreign aid. However,
Kim aimed to wean North Korea from all foreign dependence as soon as the economy
stabilized. He did so by utilizing Soviet strategy and seizing control over the government,
the military, and obtaining economic independence (A. Kim, 1970; Suh, 1973). By the end
of 1956, Kim Il-Sung was named leader.
By 1957, Kim’s position in the Party had been solidified. Kim and his supporters
had successfully completed the collectivization of 98 percent of North Korea’s farm land
(A. Kim, 1970; Rudolph, 1959). This meant that the KWP had majority control over
political and territorial decisions. The members of these collectives were also educated on
the ideals and values of communism. Kim recognized the importance of educating all North
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Korean people on communist ideals and often acknowledge the threat posed by remaining
support for Japanese imperialist and capitalist philosophies (Yang, 1980). Much of North
Korea’s foreign policy between 1956 and 1960 promoted independence. This is most
apparent in the policy of juche (self-reliance) adopted by Kim. In the mid-1960s, “selfreliance” became the official policy of the North Korean government (Armstrong, 2005;
Yang, 1980).
The situations highlighted above are important turning points in the history of North
Korea. The realignment of political power within the government represents the clear
formation of new primary group affiliations. Additionally, the collectivization of farmland
served to broaden the scope of the new group affiliations beyond a political reformation.
The collectivization of farmland increased the size of the group. The theoretical outline
notes that periods of intense strain will result in the assembly of people with similar beliefs.
In the case of NK, the collectivization of farmland illustrates this process.
Primary Group Socialization. Maier-Katkin et al. (2009) defines primary group
socialization as the normal process by which individuals assimilate into groups. Drawing
from self-control theory, Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) suggest that the creation of new
primary groups allows for individuals to affiliate with “persons of similar dispositions”
thus, encouraging the socialization process. Moreover, the fear caused by intense,
widespread strain encourages the socialization of newly formed groups. Additionally, in
the North Korean case, this fear was exacerbated and encouraged by the “us versus them”
mentality established by the nationalism and “self-reliance” policies of Kim Il-Sung. The
Kim Il-Sung regime utilized the philosophies of nationalism and “self-reliance” in order to
facilitate the dispersion of fear. Evidence for this is seen in the communist education
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program that took place during the collectivization of farmland. Fear played a significant
role in the mobilization and dispersion of non-conventional values in NK—with no other
legitimate political entity to turn to, individuals were more likely to conform in order to
protect themselves from violence and dehumanization at the hands of the state. For
example, as Yoo Young Bok recalls of his time as a prisoner of war in 1953:
…There was a lot of peer pressure. And those who stood up against the North
Koreans were publicly executed and were secretly transported. I learned later that they
were taken to the political prison camps. So most of us decided to keep quiet, because we
knew, if we complained, that we would only be victimized further (Kirby, Biserko, &
Darusman, 2013h, p. 4).
Other interviewees express similar sentiments. Former prisoner Mr. Kim Hyuk recalls:
At that time in North Korea, we couldn’t say all the things that we wanted to say
because everyone knew we couldn’t talk about Kim Il-sung…whenever you say the name
of Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-Il, you would have to say it in a very honorific way. So you
just couldn’t complain; you just could not, you know, resist (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman,
2013f, pp. 53–54)
Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) argue that when the state becomes associated with
the use of violence and dehumanization, its role as a provider of individual security
diminishes. Maier-Katkin (2009) asserts that after the establishment of new primary group
affiliations, “the normal group processes socialization and conformity… will be the
principal mechanisms by which individuals are brought to participate in crimes against
humanity” (p.239). However in North Korea, fear, driven by the philosophies of
nationalism and “self-reliance” expedited the process of conformity. More than
conformity, these concepts required obedience because if an individual disagreed with the
authority system, they were subjected to severe persecution. The theoretical outlines
dictates that structured groups who value obedience legitimize actions taken by the group,
clouding culpability.
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In some cases, as illustrated by the testimony of Bok and Hyuk, interviewees
expressed a perceived inability to disagree with the ruling authority in NK. In other cases,
individuals decided on conformity in order to protect their own quality of life. For instance,
North Korean soldier’s basic needs such as food, shelter, and clothing, were provided by
the government. In order to maintain these basic necessities many soldiers did what they
were told. Former North Korean military informant, Mr. Choi Joong Hwa reports:
It’s not that I wanted to become an informant, it’s just that when that was suggested,
if I had refused I would not have been able to survive in North Korea. You could not refuse
what they, what you were asked (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013a, p. 7).
Due to its unique social context, the process of socialization is so closely tied to primary
group beliefs that this concept will be discussed further in the next section.
4.3 PRIMARY GROUP STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS
Maier-Katkin acknowledges that the propositions proposed in their article are
sequential, meaning that a “sequence of events must unfold” in order to produce crimes
against humanity. However, the case of NK differs slightly from the outline in Figure 2.1.
One explanation for this may be the influence of communism. Kim Il-Sung structured the
NK government in a manner that reflected Joseph Stalin’s vision of communism (Suh,
1973; Yang, 1980). The communist system encourages individual ideology to follow and
adhere to the ideology of the state—the concept of nationalism is commonly used to
encourage adherence to newly established primary group structures (Scalapino, 1977).
By 1958, Kim Il-Sung became a household name and the most powerful individual
in NK (Rudolph, 1959). Kim Il-Sung’s beliefs had spread throughout the KWP and were
infused into the North Korean society. Former North Korean citizen Kim Young Soon says:
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…In North Korea, there are 10 principles and we are not to damage the reputation and we
are only to live in loyalty to Kim Il-sung and his family. That is the principle 1. And we
only had loyalty for these great leaders, and the Labor Party. And only the great leader
would be responsible for the life of the people of North Korea. That is why I had such
allegiance and loyalty to the Kim family (Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 4).
She also explains that many North Korean citizens were “brainwashed to live happy under
the regime” (Kim Young Soon as cited by Kirby et al., 2013a, p. 13). The ideals of juche,
communism, and nationalism were used to justify and encourage obedience to the Kim
family and the KWP. Political prisoner Mr. Kang Chol Hwan explains:
My grandmother was a hard-core communist… But when her husband was taken
away to the political camp and when all of us, her kids, were sent to the political camp,
that’s when she began to have regrets. The communism that she believed in, and the reality
of the communism, there was a huge gap in the ideal communism. Everybody fared well,
whereas in North Korea, in the communist North, everything was about upholding and
protecting the Kim Il-Sung family and Kim Il-Sung. That was not a communist society; it
was a pseudo-communist society. So my grandmother thought that she had made the wrong
choice and because of that, she felt that she had put the family into this ordeal (Kirby,
Biserko, & Darusman, 2013j, p. 61)
These quotes illustrate the influence of group structure on individual’s group affiliations in
NK, in some cases giving them no choice or “brainwashing” them to subscribe to the
primary group affiliations preferred by the authority. In fact, Kim Hwan testified that many
high ranking officials have been to the “revolutionary” zone Yodok where re-education is
said to take place. Additionally, several former North Korean soldiers testified that they
also received ideology training. While few former soldiers were interviewed, each echoed
the same sentiment concerning ideology education. For example, Kim Joo-Il recounts his
training as a soldier, stating:
Starting from nine o'clock for about two hours the soldiers were given education
about idolizing Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il. And then they were given education about
political awareness as well. This was part of the military training but those soldiers who
were stationed near the DMZ (De-Militarization Zone) area… the problem was that they
would - the soldiers would find balloons that had been planted or that had been dropped by
the South Korean government and in those they would find radios, rice or some candy.
45

Then the North Korean government will brainwash the soldiers saying if you eat any of
these goods that the South Korean's dropped in their balloons, your flesh will start to rot.
And that's what's contained in the indoctrination training - that kind of brainwashing
(Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013b, p. 9).
This ideological training also occurred in other conventional institutions across NK
like school and work. One witness, referred to as Mrs. L, testifies about her experience as
a college student in NK. She notes that in her sophomore year of college she was forced to
spend the majority of her study time practicing a dance that was to be performed in front
of Kim Jong-Il. The purpose of this dance was understood as a test and show of loyalty to
the Kim family and the Party. She recalls:
Most people didn’t want to participate, so they reluctantly participated, but to the
supervisors, we could not say we were reluctant. We could not say no, but they would be
talking among themselves saying that they are not that willing to do it. It was a hard practice
for about a year, so during hot summer days as well as cold days. Of course, nobody would
really want to do that (Kirby et al., 2013l, p. 36).
This dance performance is similar to the event held each year known as the Mass Games.
Although Mrs. L never participated in the Games she did attest to knowledge of the Games,
specifically, the well-known story of an 8 year old boy who died because he continued to
practice the dance although he had appendicitis. Mrs. L explains that this story was
celebrated in NK; the little boy became a hero because he “dedicate[d] his life to this event”
(Kirby et al., 2013l, p. 38). This memory illustrates exactly how far the juche ideology had
been absorbed by the “ordinary” members of society. In NK, the death of this 8 year-old
boy incited feelings of nationalism and further encouraged acceptance of Kim Il-Sung’s
philosophies. Moreover, allegiance to the Kim family and the KWP, as well as juche
ideology was so interwoven into NK society that several of the NK interviewees reported
that they did not even know of the concept “human rights” until they escaped the country
(Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013a; Kirby et al., 2013e).
46

Another interviewee, Jihyun Park, also testifies that schooling was commonly
interrupted in order to perform other tasks that honored the Kim family and demonstrated
solidarity for the Party. Park explains,
In the schools we don’t just study. In addition to studying we were supposed to clean the
school over the breaks we would clean the school again and after the school we used to
provide our [labours] to the farms nearby (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013b, pp. 3–4).
Obedience to Kim and to the Party was valued above education and in some cases the lives
of individuals. Maier-Katkin’s theoretical organization suggests that group structure will
determine authority and law systems; however, in the case of NK this process appears
reversed. That is, the authority and legal system required specific group structures and
social roles. Thus, the type of group structure developed under the influence of the
authority provides a false sense of legitimacy to any actions taken by the group. In order to
preserve their quality of life many individuals either willingly or under pressure into
adopted values of violence and dehumanization. As previously discussed, this concept has
been noted in other contexts, most notably Zimbardo’s Prison Experiment (1971). Mrs. L
explains that North Korean people do not riot or revolt because they fear that their entire
family will be punished (Kirby et al., 2013e). Kang Chol-Hwan explained this describing
how in NK, “you are guilty, there is guilt by association. So, if your father does something
wrong, the sons, as well as the grandchildren, are punished as well” (Kirby et al., 2013j, p.
60). This fear is perpetuated by the structure as well as the dynamics of the group and are
further encouraged by the belief system.
4.4 PRIMARY GROUP BELIEF SYSTEMS
The socialization of primary group beliefs in NK can be attributed to several
factors: (1) forced ideology training in conventional institutions, “revolutionary districts,”
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and prison camps, (2) the degree of obedience required by the group structure/dynamics,
and (3) the control and limitation of information by Kim and the KWP. These tactics
artificially united the North Korean leaders and people against outside forces and
encouraged the values of nationalism and “self-reliance” at all costs.
In the North Korean case, primary group affiliations rooted heavily in communist
ideals required a specific group structure in which the majority of power belonged to Kim
Il-Sung and other high ranking party officials. As such, the socialization and conformity
process was largely driven by Party policies and the guiding philosophies of Kim Il-Sung.
Kim’s nationalism and juche philosophies engulfed NK in the 1950s and remain an integral
part of the guiding belief system in the country today. Several interviewees from different
decades illustrate the strategies by which these philosophies were infused into North
Korean politics and everyday social life.
Forced Relocations. Multiple COI witnesses addressed the forcible transfer of a
large population of Japanese-Koreans. Japanese journalist Ishidaka Kenji testified that
during the Korean War, the North Korean government coerced or forced approximately
93,000 South Koreans and 7,000 Japanese Koreans to return to NK (Kirby, Biserko, &
Darusman, 2013k). Korean ethnics living in Japan were encouraged to bring their wealth
back to NK so that they could contribute to NK society. In some cases, “they [the NK
authority] forced the families to abduct other people so that they can [guarantee] the safety
of their family in North Korea” (Ishidaka Kenji as cited by Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman,
2013i, p. 4).
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In other cases, propaganda was used to coerce the return of Koreans and others
living abroad. For example, Saito Hiroko, the Japanese wife of an ethnic Korean man,
relocated with her husband to NK with the understanding that NK would be like a paradise.
However, Mrs. Hiroko attests that NK was more like “hell on earth” (Kirby et al., 2013m,
p. 12). She described NK using a metaphor, comparing the country to the apartments of the
capital, Pyongyang, which she saw upon her arrival:
There is a frontal side and back side in the reality of North Korea. Frontal view of
the apartment; you may think that this apartment is beautiful, beautifully decorated by tiles
and so forth, and that is the building in Pyongyang, but if you go back to the back of that
apartment, then you can see dark and dirty apartment (Kirby et al., 2013m, p. 12).
In order to maintain the “paradise on earth” image, North Korean authorities also
monitored communication to and from Japan. Still, some Japanese “returnees” found
creative ways to communicate with their families in Japan. Figure 4.1 shows an encoded
message written on the back of a stamp. Interviewees testify that letters sent to Japan were
reviewed before they were mailed, however, this secret message was able to go undetected

Figure 4.1 Secret Message3

3

Image provided by Mr. Yamada Fumiaki at the Tokyo Public Hearing, 30 August 2013, morning.

49

and warned of the situation in NK. The message reads: “We cannot leave the village. Older
brother do not come. Mother says she wishes to see you. Tell our sister in Toyama also not
to come. What Bunto’s father said is correct” (UNGA, 2014, pp. 293–294).
After the forced migrants served their purpose to NK, they were cast aside, many
of them treated as criminals (Kirby et al., 2013m). One interviewee, Professor Yamada
Fumiaki talks about a period called Magyabi, which occurred during the 1970s and 1980s.
During this time, many people disappeared, even if they had not necessarily committed a
crime. Also during this time, the use of Japanese language was deemed illegal in NK. Even
outsiders who had once served a purpose in NK were no longer welcome and deemed a
threat to the juche philosophy (Kirby et al., 2013m).
Forced Ideology Training. In NK, because the group structure demands
obedience, prisoners are viewed as traitors to the Kim family and the Party and as such,
they are “re-educated” to perform the social roles expected of them. As discussed above,
many former interviewees noted that they were subjected to re-education and forced
ideology training in conventional settings. However some cases occurred in specialized
re-education prisons known as “revolutionary districts” (Kang Chol Hwan as cited in
Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013c, p. 54). Revolutionary zones are considered NK’s
ordinary prison camps (Kyo-Hwa-So) where prisoners with shorter sentences are held with
the main goal of rehabilitation. On the other hand, political prison camps were institutions
with retributive goals that served as punishment centers for serious offenders with longer
sentences.
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According to Ms. Kim Young Soon, after the War, citizens who openly opposed
the Kim regime were sent to prison camps. Her testimony discloses that during her time in
the prison camp she witnessed a wide range of prisoners enter the camp—from high level
supervisors to soccer players to eye doctors. However, it has been difficult to pinpoint the
exact time in which these camps were formed—from the transcripts released by the UN
the earliest reported use of NK prison camps comes from the testimony of Ms. Soon who
was imprisoned in Yodok camp in 1970 (Kirby et al., 2013a).
The interviewees’ responses indicate that both prisoners of the “revolutionary
districts” and of the political prisons (Kwan-Li-So) were subjected to ideology training
sessions. In the prison camps, they are taught that the Kim family is the brain of NK and
the nationalists who support him make up the arms, hands, and legs of the body (Kirby et
al., 2013d). In the early 1950s, Yamada Fumiaki spent several years in NK against his will
as a member of the 7,000 Japanese “returned” to North Korea. He explains the concept of
juche, noting that in NK, “…the brain is Kim Il-Sung and you must work for him, you must
follow his idea” (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013l, p. 10). Hence, juche dictates that all
productive members of NK society must work to achieve the ideas of Kim Il-Sung. In
North Korea, if one person is not fulfilling their social role then the whole system suffers;
therefore it is in the best interest of all group members to ensure full participation in and
acceptance of Kim Il-Sung and the Party’s values.
Violence is utilized to reinforce the values of obedience and nationalism. Kang
Chol-Hwan was taken to Yodok revolutionary camp when he was 9 years old because his
father was found to be a traitor. Mr. Hwan testifies that labor in these camps is less intense
and prisoners enjoy a less controlled environment. However, “when it came to the torture…
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and when it came to the executions, it was almost the same” (Kang Chol-Hwan as cited in
Kirby et al., 2013c, p. 56). The use of torture in State run prison camps highlights the
priorities of the North Korean belief system, sending the message that the use of violence
is an acceptable means of achieving obedience. While the use of violence within the prison
camps was known by North Korea’s citizens, sanctioned acts of violence rarely occurred
outside the walls of the prison camps. Instead, the threat of imprisonment was used to
encourage obedience and dispersion of Party beliefs to North Korean citizens. For example,
a former follower of the “self-reliance” philosophy, Kim Young Hwan recalls, “…With
just a slip of [the] tongue, you could be sent to a political prison camp (Kwan-Li-So)”
(Kirby et al., 2013j, p. 4). One reason that physical violence is limited to the prison camps
may be in order to maintain legitimacy of the authority and law systems.
Also, the limitation of information is commonly utilized by the NK government as
a way to maintain primary group beliefs. Kim and the Party control many social institutions
in NK responsible for the distribution of information and as such are able to control what
information is dispersed. Moreover, since gaining autonomy in 1959, the leaders of NK
have been slowly implementing several measures aimed at isolating NK from the rest of
the world. For example, in the early 1960s NK criminalized the ownership of tunable
radios—only fixed-station radios were available for purchase in NK (Lankov, 1960).
Additionally, NK’s law limits individuals’ freedom of movement, which prevents them
from leaving the country and even monitors their movement within the country. Dr. Cho
Jung Hyun of the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU), a South Korean policy
institute, says, “They [North Korea] have adopted the travel permit system, which means
that you need a special permit to leave your neighbourhood and go to another place” (Hyun
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as cited by Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 42). This isolation may have contributed to individual
level acceptance of group beliefs. Another explanation for the acceptance of these group
beliefs may be that there have been or are few legitimate alternatives. In some case,
freedom of movement limitations triggered resistance among North Korean citizens.
However, individuals who broke these laws were oftentimes arrested. As a result, many
North Korean citizens respected these limitations in order to serve their own self-interests
of stay out of prison.
Maier-Katkin et al. conclude that in environments “dominated by strain,
physiological arousal, and fear” belief systems will be easily influenced by an individual’s
self-interest. There is evidence for this proposition in the NK case. The decades of strain
instilled widespread personal insecurity and fear among North Koreans. As a result, new
primary group affiliations were created and structured around the ideals of communism
and the philosophies of Kim Il-Sung. Once he was in control of the Party, Kim Il-Sung
used his position of power to implement policies that terrorized the population and limited
the dispersion of information, leaving many citizens with one viable option—to accept the
group’s beliefs and accept their social roles as assigned by the authority.
4.4 DISPLACEMENT OF AGGRESSION
Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) explain the important role that group structure and
authority play in mobilizing and creating opportunities for perpetrators of CAH. My review
of the North Korean belief system shows strong evidence that policies and philosophies of
the NK authority created several opportunities for individuals to displace their aggression.
As reviewed above, several interviewees have referred to the prison camps of North Korea
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and described the violence that occurs within these prisons. The testimonies suggest that
the Kim family and the KWP utilize these political prison camps as a means of encouraging
obedience. The testimony given to the UN suggests that prison camps are central places
where violence is perpetuated.
All of the interviewees who had experienced the prison camps firsthand reported
being forcibly taken to special housing by Bowibu, the NK National Security Agency. It
was only after they reached the Bowibu investigation facility that the use of violence
occurred. In some cases, the Bowibu would hold and torture prisoners for as long as 6
months in order to coerce a confession (Kim Eun Cheol as cited by Kirby et al., 2013c).
However, torture was not limited to the Bowibu facilities, as torture continued within the
political prisons themselves. Although the existence of prison camps are widely denied by
the NK government, the presence of political prison camps is well known by the general
population of NK (UNGA, 2014). A map created by the UN shown in Figure 4.2 illustrates
the approximate location of “revolutionary districts” and political prison camps. The map
was drawn based on the testimony received by the UN’s Commission of Inquiry.
Formerly a homeless child in NK, Mr. Kim Hyuk was sentenced to 3 years in one
of NK’s “revolutionary districts” for the crime of leaving the country in search of food. His
testimony reveals that prison camps are well known to the general population of NK and
the North Korean government uses these camps as a deterrent (Kirby et al., 2013f).
According to Mr. Hyuk, it is well known in North Korean society that survival was unlikely
upon relocation to political prison camps. Violence was most prevalent in controlled
environments like the prisons and Bowibu investigation facilities. One reason, discussed
above, might be that authority and law system remain legitimate when violence occurs in
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controlled environments. Another reason may be that violence is only used against those
who are a perceived or confirmed threat to the goals of the primary group— individuals
who are concentrated within prison camps in North Korea.
Several interviewees reported being tortured during investigation by the Bowibu.
For example, Mr. Kim Eun Cheol recalls the torture he endured while detained in one of
NK’s Bowibu investigation facilities:
Bowibu, once you get caught, you are treated like a dog. I was interrogated and was
investigated for about 6 months. I was tortured. I was beaten… I was beaten so badly, that
6 of my teeth, my upper teeth and lower teeth, were broken. And they had me kneeled, so
my knees are all scratched and hurt (Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 23).
Another former prisoner Mr. Jeong Kwang-Il recalls his arrest and experience with the
Bowibu:
I think it was July 1999, I think it was 9oclock at night. I was sleeping at a friend’s
house and I was arrested at night. And I was arrested and taken…As soon as I was in the
room they started beating me…And they said that I should acknowledge, that I should
confess that I am a spy. But I told them I’m not a spy but they kept beating me. For two
weeks, I was beaten with clubs and they had what’s called “pigeon of torture” where they
would hang me upside-down. I kept saying that I’m not a spy…I received pigeon torture
for ten months. And I was about 75kg before the arrest, but after ten months, I was down
to 36kg. I could not endure this anymore so I confessed that I was given a spy’s job from
South Korea. I had given up (Kirby et al., 2013d, pp. 34–35).
It is reported that torture techniques are taught to members of the Bowibu. Former prison
guard Mr. Ahn Myong Chul dictates:
I mean there is no instruction book. They simply use the torture tools around, and
they are taught by their seniors or superiors how to do the torture… Their superiors would
tell them or the seniors would tell them which spot would hurt the most. Bowibu would be
responsible for the torture (Kirby et al., 2013e, p. 22).
Once a prisoner has been relocated to the prison, their interaction with the Bowibu
decreases. Although the Bowibu are still responsible for making decisions about public
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Figure 4.2 United Nations Map of Prison Camps4

4

Map produced by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, January 28, 2014.
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executions and torture, day to day interaction with the Bowibu is limited within the
confines of the prison. Prison guards were responsible for the oversight of prison labor and
punishment. Although prison guards are considered part of the military, their training is
different. Mr. Chul informed the COI about his guard training experience:
Well, the political prison guards... the kind of training that we received the most is
related to ideology, so we are trained and educated about the allegiance and loyalty to Kim
Il-Sung. We actually receive two hours more than the military. About 60 percent of the
training was about the ideology, and the rest was about physical training and about how to
oppress the riots. So, we had very intensive ideology training for six months, and that
training is to… I guess invoke hostility against the inmates and to imprint in our minds that
the inmates are enemies… So they would have like a lecture material. The training material
is confidential, so we have different ideology training than the ordinary military, so we
would write down. We would memorize the instructions, the orders from Kim Il-Sung and
Kim Jung-Il (Kirby et al., 2013e, p. 19).
The political prison camps are used by the NK government to house a wide array
of offenders. Some were imprisoned for knowing too much about the Kim family and its
relatives, while other were sent to these camps as punishment for crimes like theft of food,
attempting to escape NK, and interaction with South Koreans ( Kim Young Soon, Kim Eun
Cheol, and Jeong Kwang-Il as cited by Kirby et al., 2013e). This was a red flag for the
COI. All of the interviewees reported their reasons for being taken to these political prison
camps, however, many of these transgressions were not recognized by the international
community as a justifiable means for imprisonment (UNGA, 2014). Additionally, a certain
level of due process is expected. Former prisoner Mr. Kim Kwang-Il talks about the lack
of due process in NK:
Well, in North Korea, by law, you are supposed to be given an arrest warrant but
you are never given an arrest warrant in North Korea. They just arrest you. And by the law
of North Korea, they need to have a case in order to be able to detain you and you need a
time period of investigation to find out whether you have actually violated the law or not.
But, without all of this due diligence I was arrested, without due process of law I was
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arrested. There was no legal process taken to verify whether I had actually violated any
law or not. I was detained right away (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013i, p. 5).
It appears that despite North Korean laws put in place to protect its citizen’s right to due
process, violations of individual rights occur on a widespread basis. Oftentimes, political
prisoners in NK are held for excessive periods of time without ever being informed of the
reason for their detention. Former North Korean guard Mr. Ahn Myong Chul testifies that
many people were imprisoned without warning, cause, or even trial. He states:
Ninety percent of people there (Kaechon prison) had no idea why they were in the
camps. They all told me that one night when they were in bed, suddenly Bowibu people
came to their house and they got arrested, and sometimes they told [me] that they were
being punished for a crime that [was] committed by someone they knew (Kirby et al.,
2013d, p. 11).
Mr. Shin Dong Hyuk was born inside of one of NK’s prisons, the reason his mother had
been arrested was unknown to him:
I don’t know exact details as to why my Mom came to be in the camp…it may not
be 100% accurate, but from what I understand my father’s relatives…I think the older
brother (father’s brother) went to South Korea, so that’s what I understand, that’s what I
heard when I was younger. And, that’s not 100% accurate but that’s what I know (Kirby,
Biserko, & Darusman, 2013c, p. 6).
One explanation for this may be NK’s “guilt by association” policy which encourages the
punishment of the alleged criminal as well as three generations of his family. The UN views
this policy as a state sponsored policy endorsing extermination of possible political
opponents. This is evidence of a national policy put in place to encourage the individual
level displacement of aggression.
Furthermore, Mr. Shin Dong Hyuk’s experience highlights that pregnant women
and infants are not shown sympathy and are not pardoned from abuse in NK’s prison
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camps. Other interviewees also testified to violence against pregnant women and children.
Mr. Chul recalls:
The leader of my platoon or my team battalion was Han Dae Chul. He raped one of
the inmates and the woman actually got pregnant and gave birth to a baby in the field. The
baby and the woman they were taken to detention houses. And they were trying to find out
who the father was. The inmate said that she was raped by one of the soldiers, [then] the
baby was put into a pot where the meal was made for military dogs (Kirby et al., 2013e, p.
8).
The treatment of pregnant women and infants was also addressed by anonymous
interviewees. Ms. P. testified, “Three pregnant women were hit in the stomach. Newborns
who were born there starved to death” (Kirby et al., 2013e, p. 29). Prison guard’s
indiscriminate use of violence suggests that prisoners were viewed as less than human.
Further, this level of violence against all prisoners suggests that North Korea’s political
prison camps are used as a means to control and exterminate large numbers of people.
Extermination can be achieved through several tactics that include “withholding of
necessities of life” and “the imposition of living arrangements that would knowingly lead
to mass deaths” (UNGA, 2014, p. 324). Basically, the living conditions of the prison camps
were intended to result in the death of the majority of the prison population. This is best
illustrated through the testimony of former prison guard of Kaechon, Mr. Ahn Myong Chul.
His statements highlighted above have shed light on the inner workings of North Korea’s
prison camps as well as the training and ideology of the prison guards. Additionally, he
testifies that prison guards are taught that prisoners are not supposed to survive camp.
Explaining the ideology, he says guards are taught to believe that they should be violent
with prisoners. He elaborates, “We should attack them. We really don’t care if we are going
to kill them or let them live” (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013f, p. 6).
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Figure 4.3 illustrates some types of torture utilized by prison guards in NK. The
first two drawings known as “pigeon and motorcycle” torture, were created based on the
experiences of former prisoners. The third drawing depicts “coffin” torture and was drawn
while the torture was occurring. Prisoner Jeong Kwang-Il testified to being a victim of
pigeon torture. He describes this torture for the COI:
This pigeon torture, so you are hand-cuffed behind your back and then they hang
you so that you would not be able to stand or sit and you would look like pigeon, the pigeon
with their chest pushed out; you would sort of look like a pigeon. I saw this book about
torture and I understand that torture was conducted during the colonial times and in North
Korea, the criminals are kept at the detention houses and the detention houses are in North
Korea are copied after the detention houses that were built during the Japanese colonial
rule (Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 34).
Other prisoners also report being punished with these types of specialized torture. Mr. Kim
Kwang-Il describes the “motorcycle” torture he endured:
At the detention center, we are on our knees and there is a glass and we are supposed
to be in the same position until the glass is filled. We are supposed to think there’s an
imaginary motorcycle and we are supposed to be in this position as if we are riding the
motorcycle. And for this, we pose as if we are airplanes ourselves. We are flying. And if
we stand like this there’s no way that you can hold that position for a long time. You are
bound to fall forward. Everybody in the detention center goes through this kind of this
torture (Kirby et al., 2013i, p. 11).
The final drawing depicting “coffin” torture is also described by Mr. Kim Kwang-Il.
Guards would force prisoners into coffin-like confinement sometimes for days (Kirby et
al., 2013i). However, abuse in the prison camps is not limited to physical torture. What’s
more, in his testimony Korean scholar Dr. Lee Geum Soon acknowledges that many
inmates commit CAH against other inmates in order to survive or simply out of fear (Kirby
et al., 2013e). Emotional abuse is also prevalent within the camps. All of the interviewees
that had experienced prison life acknowledged that they witnessed executions during their
time in camp. Additionally, these executions are conducted for a broad range of crimes.
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Figure 4.3 Torture Drawings5

5

Drawings by Kwon Hyo Jin, presented to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry by Kim Kwang-Il on
August 28, 2013.
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For example, former Yodok prisoner, Mr. Kim Eun Cheol witnessed two executions during
his year at the camp between 2002 and 2003. According to Mr. Cheol, both inmates were
executed for stealing food (Kirby et al., 2013d, pp. 29–30). As part of the execution process,
these inmates were sent to solitary confinement. Recalling the executions that he witnessed
Mr. Cheol states that when prisoners were transferred to the execution sites, “You could
see that they were already on the verge of dying” (Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 30). Moreover,
Mr. Cheol attests that his brother was executed for attempting to escape to South Korea,
acknowledging that the execution for this offense was commonplace. Additionally, these
executions were performed in front of prisoners of all ages, for example, Mr. Kim Hyuk
witnessed his first execution at age 9 (Kirby et al., 2013d).
However, not all executions were sanction by NK policies. While public executions
were used in some cases, it was more common for the prisoners to die as a result of the
conditions of the prison. Moreover, some deaths were caused by overzealous guards. Mr.
Ahn Myong Chul addresses this issue during his testimony recalling that fellow guard,
Kang Young Chul, engaged in the killing of prisoners for “no reason.” Furthermore, he
mentions that officials were made aware of these killings, but no punishment was assigned
to Kang Young Chul because he “killed out of allegiance to the Bowibu” (Kirby et al.,
2013e, p. 4). The concept of “ordinary” people becoming perpetrators of CAH is discussed
by both Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin (2009). In environments like
NK’s prison camps, strain, group affiliations, and group structure has influenced the values
and beliefs accepted by large populations. In the case of NK, people who were once
everyday citizens now value obedience and use violence against a dehumanized population
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in order to achieve it. As such, the guards do not feel as if they are acting “overzealously”—
instead they are abiding by the laws of their society, albeit a non-conventional society.
While torture and violence account for many deaths within the North Korean prison
camps, many deaths can also be attributed to inadequate access to food, forced labor, and
diseased living conditions in North Korean prison camps. Although most prisoners
interviewed did report that they were fed three meals a day, all former prisoners agree that
the rations provided were not enough to survive comfortably. For example, anonymous
interviewee Ms. P reported that:
We were given corn rice, corn based food, just enough to keep us alive. Young
male inmates for example, it was very insufficient, so male inmates would find worms or
snakes in the field when they were working there. They would eat them alive to feel that
feeling in the stomach. The food was never enough, and that’s how they got by (Kirby et
al., 2013e, p. 30).
While there are certainly many instances of systematic violence equivalent to CAH being
committed within North Korea’s prison camps, the COI concluded that the deplorable
conditions of the prison camps themselves constitute a “widespread and systematic” attack
pursuant to State policies. Furthermore, these prisons provide a secure place for guards to
commit violent acts against North Korean citizens. The COI noted that “in some cases, the
Commission was able to trace orders to cause the disappearance of individuals to the camps
to the level of the Supreme Leader” (UNGA, 2014, p. 330).
The testimony of NK defectors has provided evidence of violent crimes committed
against the prison population and the general population of North Korea. International laws
established by the Nuremburg trials deem these violations as crimes against humanity.
Interviews conducted by the UN’s COI provide important insights as to the intent of
policies encouraged by the Kim family and the Party, and first-hand accounts of the quality
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of life in NK. Interviewees were able to identify violent and dehumanizing values
propagated by the Kim family and the KWP. A few examples include the use of prison
camps, the limitation of movement and information, the use of forceful abductions to gain
labor skills and increase the wealth of NK, forced ideology education, and the exacerbation
of the starvation epidemic. The actual perpetrators of crime in North Korea are often
“ordinary” citizens who have accepted the role of “prison guard” or “Bowibu” assigned to
them by the Kim family regime and the KWP. The Kim family regime and the KWP have
created a primary group system in which obedience is valued above all else. Prison camps
in North Korea offer an avenue in which anger can be directed towards unguarded targets
and further provides individuals with a sense of legitimacy regarding their actions.
4.6 A TURNING OF THE TIDE?
During the mid-1980s, the North Korean leadership made an effort to establish ties
with the outside world. This was, in part, due to the transfer of power from Kim Il-Sung to
his son, Kim Jung-Il (Shinn, 1983). However, continued setbacks in Korean reunification
occurred as a result of a violent outbreak known as the Rangoon Bombing that killed 17
South Korean officials in 1983. Unfortunately, North Korea’s involvement in this incident
also led to the severance of diplomatic relations with Burma, Comora, Costa Rica, Japan,
and Western Samoa (Kihl, 1985). Additionally, during this coming out period, North Korea
attempted to establish relations with the United States, even going so far as to invite US
congressmen to visit the country (Kihl, 1985; Mercer, 2013). It remains possible that the
extension of this olive brank to the US was propaganda although other scenarios suggest
that the North Korean commitment to rebuilding its image was existent. This was most
apparent in their humanitarian aid efforts following a devastating flood in South Korea—
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the North Korean Red Cross Society provided aid in the form of cement, rice, and textiles
(Kihl, 1985). However, these humanitarian efforts were halted during the 1990s when
famine struck North Korea.
Famine in the 1990s. During the 1990s famine struck NK. These problems were
exacerbated by NK officials who hoarded food for themselves and for the troops (Aaltola,
1999). The famine stemmed from a variety of factors, all of which cannot be attributed to
the NK government or its policies. For North Korea, the 1990s brought about the
withdrawal of Soviet economic support, a series of floods and droughts, as well as the
transfer of power in NK from Kim Il-Sung to his son Kim Jong-Il (H. Kim, 2003).
Nonetheless, the famine illustrated the inability and unwillingness of the North Korean
government to handle large scale disaster in NK.
UN foreign aid was provided to NK in the form of food; however, the North Korean
government used the food as leverage to encourage obedience amongst citizens and
soldiers (Jiro a cited by Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013). As a result, the NK people
were able to retake some power from the authority with the creation of stable market
systems. Additionally, Mr. Ishamiru Jiro contends that the problem in NK is the
population’s access to food as opposed to a food shortage. As a result, the famine
encouraged the growth of black markets for the sale of food. These black markets were not
contested by the North Korean government because they simply did not have the ability to
provide for all citizens. Jiro says, “…From what I observed, 70-80% of people now gain
food by buying food using their cash in these kinds of market, so they don’t rely on the
food ration from the government” (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013, p. 24). Although
the army accounted for 5% of the population with about 1.2 million soldiers registered, the
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NK authority was unable to supply food to all of its soldiers (H. Kim, 2003). Moreover,
NK soldiers had limited access to the newly established black markets because the
government provides “food in exchange for obedience” (Jiro as cited by Kirby et al., 2013,
p. 27). Although 0.7 million tons of foreign food aid has been donated to NK, even from
the United States, starvation continues to be a problem in NK (Aaltola, 1999). However,
Jiro notes that since the transfer of power from Kim Jong-Il to his son, Kim Jong-Un,
policies have encouraged the confiscation of crops from rural farmlands in order to
maintain healthy troops, consistent with NK’s “military first” policy. This has drastically
affected the rural populations in NK and as such, Jiro reports that many of these citizens
maintain a strong desire for change (Kirby et al., 2013j).
While North Korea has made some attempts at reconnecting with conventional
society and conventional institutions like the UN, some policies that value violence and
dehumanization remain in place today, especially in the prison camps of North Korea.
However, under the son of Kim Jong-Il and current Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-Un, North
Korea has shown signs of cooperation. Dr. Lee Geum Soon testifies that the number of
public executions has dropped since 2009 when the transfer of power to Kim Jong-Un
began (Kirby et al., 2013e, p. 38). Although, quantifiable evidence of a decrease in public
executions remains unavailable, KINU scholars remain confident that a causal link
between the decrease and succession of power to Kim Jong-Un exists (Cho et al., 2013).
Moreover, on October 4, 2014, North Korea agreed to reopen unification talks with South
Korea. This new openness might signal the dissolution of the Kim family’s control after
60 years and two successions of power. One thing is clear, since the 1980s, the philosophies
established by Kim Il-Sung and perpetuated by his lineage have been slowly losing their
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influence in North Korea. While certain government sponsored policies continue to utilize
violent and dehumanizing techniques, the overwhelming number of witnesses willing to
speak out against the Supreme Leader and the Party demonstrates a definite backlash is
occurring against philosophies of the Kim family regime.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
5.1 CONCLUSION
State sponsored crimes against humanity account for a significant number of deaths
each year. The magnitude of such crime demands attention. To date, there are few entities
capable of addressing these crimes. While the last several decades have garnered
responsiveness to international crimes, the laws regarding these crimes remain difficult to
enforce. The increasing globalization of our society requires that an effective means of
dealing with CAH perpetrators be established. Theories aid social scientists in the
understanding of new phenomena and as such, several theories of CAH have been posited
in recent years. This thesis has discussed and analyzed the theories of Brannigan and
Hardwick (2003) as well as Maier-Katkin et al (2009) in order to determine how well these
theories describe and explain CAH in the case of North Korea. This examination was able
to identify key turning points specific to the North Korean case that help to explain how
and why CAH occurred.
Informed by historical analysis and existing theory, this thesis utilized information
provided by the United Nation’s Commission of Inquiry to determine the progression and
severity of state perpetrated crimes against humanity in North Korea. On February 17, 2014
the UN’s COI released a detailed report acknowledging evidence of CAH in North Korea.
The COI, also released all supporting evidence and documentation including the transcripts
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of eye-witnesses and expert testimonies. This evidence was analyzed using the case study
methods outline by Robert K. Yin (Yin, 2014).
There are many advantages to utilizing case study methods, especially in social
science fields. Case study methods enable researchers to explore contemporary phenomena
that lack theoretical grounding. Furthermore, case study research helps organize qualitative
concepts prevalent in complex social situations which facilitates the development of causal
explanations. Nonetheless, case study work has been criticized for being subjective and
prone to bias. Additionally, scholars have questioned the validity of generalizations made
from case study research. Yin rebuts this contention by noting that case studies are
generalizable to the theory or theories in which they are studying (Yin, 2014, p. 21).
Furthermore, arguments have been made that these generalizations are just one way of
gaining knowledge on a subject. Specific limitations of this method in the North Korean
case include incomplete official record keeping, limited access to the country, and limited
interviewees willing to testify. However, if any information is gained in the process of
examining a phenomenon, the research has been a success (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Smeulers &
Hola, 2009).
Results. Brannigan & Hardwick and Maier-Katkin et al. have proffered theories
capable of explaining most aspects of CAH in North Korea. The precursors and conditions
leading to violations of CAH in NK largely followed the theoretical propositions
articulated by both perspectives. The theoretical outline dictates that as a precursor to CAH
violations, intense and widespread strain occurs at the social and individual levels.
Evidence for this proposition is apparent in the case of NK. Social indicators of strain in
North Korea include Japanese imperialism, political instability, economic dependence on
69

the USSR, blocked re-unification attempts, and war. Many of these social stressors
contributed to individual level strain. For example, the political instability of Korea
following the end of Japanese imperialism resulted in the division of the country, forming
North and South Korea. Consequently, many families were separated as a result of the
division, causing individual-level strain. Additionally, the Korean War destroyed much of
NK’s infrastructure, producing strain as well as fear among the civilian population.
Following periods of intense, widespread strain in NK, rising levels of fear caused
individuals to form new primary group affiliations. Evidence for this proposition is mainly
seen in North Korea’s political shift beginning in 1956. The end of the Korean War
loosened the bonds between USSR officials and North Korean officials. In 1956, the North
Korean government formed new group identities and affiliations. Many North Korean
officials and ordinary citizens blamed the USSR for prematurely ending the Korean War
and failing to reunite North and South Korea. Thus, an “us versus them” mentality drove
Kim Il-Sung’s rise to power within the political system and rise to popularity amongst the
citizens of NK. Kim’s policies of nationalism and juche fueled this mentality and in turn,
created widespread fear—including most poignantly the fear of being sent to prison camps.
Additionally, this fear propelled the notion that anyone who opposed Kim also opposed the
nation. In the case of NK, fear promoted conformity and socialization. At this point the
case of North Korea begins to diverge from the theoretical outlines of Brannigan &
Hardwick and Maier-Katkin et al.
The new group affiliations in North Korea were driven by a political shift. As such,
one cannot ignore the influence of communism on the group structure and dynamics of
North Korea. Communist ideology dictates that individual ideology mirror that of the state.
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Therefore, the political shift in 1956 created new group affiliations and ideology demanded
socialization and conformity. Furthermore, communist ideology requires a group structure
in which the government and its leaders are providers. In order to provide for its citizens,
the government is allocated an immense amount of power. The power allotted to the
controlling political party of NK enabled Kim Il-Sung and the KWP to create authority and
legal systems. Moreover, the group structure required by the authority system limited the
types of social roles available to citizens and, further, required individuals to subscribe to
those roles or risk being viewed as enemies of the nation. For example, several interviewees
testified that loyalty to Kim Il-Sung and the KWP was the primary rule in NK (Bok, Hyuk,
and Soon as cited in Kirby et al., 2013d, 2013f, 2013h). Brannigan & Hardwick
acknowledge that the authority system will play a role in the dispersion and socialization
of primary group beliefs, however this case study of North Korea finds that the authority
system influenced group socialization as well as group structure and dynamics. This
analysis suggests that political ideology determines the extent to which authority and legal
systems influence these transitions.
As Maier-Katkin et al. notes, CAH are more likely to occur in societies whose belief
systems value self-interest, dehumanization, and violence. The level of control
implemented by the North Korean government perpetuated fear among citizens that
encouraged the dispersion of a belief system that valued the policies of nationalism and
juche established by Kim Il-Sung and the KWP. Additionally, the power allotted to the
government of NK allowed Kim Il-Sung and the KWP to implement policies aimed at
isolating the population from the international community. On a social level, these policies
encouraged laws that served the interests of North Korea (i.e. reunification, self71

sufficiency, and independence). On the individual level, these policies encouraged
obedience. The limitations placed on communication and movement served to maintain the
beliefs perpetuated by the authority and law systems. Anyone who opposed the interests of
the state was deemed a criminal and accordingly viewed as disobedient and a threat to
reunification, self-sufficiency, and independence. Consequently, North Korea’s prison
system became a controlled environment under which the displacement of aggression
occurred.
Despite theoretical inconsistencies in how the progression of CAH evolved in the
case of NK as delineated by Brannigan & Hardwick and Maier-Katkin et al., the end result
was the same: displaced aggression. In NK, ideology and fear facilitated the widespread
acceptance of Kim Il-Sung’s policies and values. Citizens who expressed resistance to
these policies and values were subjected to arrest and relocated to revolutionary districts
or prison camps depending on the nature of the offense. Conversely, citizens who exhibited
strong ideology were assigned to high ranking government roles, Bowibu police, and
prison guard roles. Individuals who accepted NK’s forced social roles were viewed as
productive members of society, whereas individuals who challenged these assigned social
roles were viewed as traitors and sent to prison, creating sharp divisions among North
Korean citizens. Those considered “productive” individuals then used this schism to justify
any and all action against nonconformists—creating conditions for CAH to occur. In
accordance with the theoretical outline, this societal divide fostered the displacement of
aggression.
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5.2 DISCUSSION
The case study indicates that CAH in NK occurred as a result of several factors
including intense, widespread strain, primary group affiliations and socialization, group
structure and dynamics, belief systems, and the displacement of aggression. Additionally,
the case study has highlighted how this theoretical outline might be improved. Specifically,
isolation and political ideology appear to have contributed to CAH in the case of North
Korea. In order to illustrate the theoretical implications of the North Korean case study, a
revised theoretical outline is proposed in Figure 5.1. Understanding how and why CAH
occurred in NK is essential to the development of effective policies aimed at eliminating
ongoing violations and preventing future violations. This thesis has explored the
phenomena of CAH and has also expanded the explanation of how and why such crimes
occur. In addition, this thesis has also challenged the characterizations of CAH as defined
by international law.
Future research should continue to explore the development of the international
justice system and accordingly challenge the systems that have been and are being
established. Furthermore, criminologist should work with academics from other disciplines
to create more surveys like the Atrocities Documentation Survey in order to further the
understanding of the magnitude of CAH violations. Considering the North Korean case,
research should continue to challenge the definitions of CAH within international law. For
example, should the coercion of a large population be considered a crime against
humanity? Finally, future research should continue to study previous CAH violations in
effort to identify additional precursors to CAH. This will aid international institutions in
the creation of international monitoring and intervention agencies.
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INTENSE, WIDESPREAD
STRAIN occurs on a social and
individual level as a precursor to
CAH. Strain produces high
levels of fear. Certain events are
easily identifiable as strain (i.e.
war, famine, economic
depression), because these events
threaten personal security and
demarcates indidviduals.
Political and economic isolation
represent an additional precursor
to CAH. Intensity and prevalence
of strain and isolation will
determine the likelyhood that
CAH will ensue.

Widespread fear results in the
deterioriation of conventional social bonds
leading to the formation of NEW
PRIMARY GROUP AFFILIATIONS
built around an "us v. them" mentality.
This mentality encourages individuals to
form groups with people who share
similar beliefs. Large-scale political shifts
foster the "us v. them" mentality and
provides a conventional arena for those
with similar beliefs to congregate.
PRIMARY GROUP SOCIALIZATION
legitimizes group actions, which clouds
culpability-- this is espcially true for
structured groups that value obedience.
Politcal ideologies that encourage
obedience will control the construction of
new group processes.

The GROUP STRUCTURE AND
DYNAMICS of the new primary group
structure are influenced by the intensity
and prevalence of strain as well as the
diffusion of socialization into social roles.
Group structure determines authority and
law systems. Authority and law systems
influence the availability of social roles.
CAH are more likely to occur when
"ordinary" individuals subscribe to the
new social roles assigned to them by the
authority system. Following the formation
of new primary group structures, normal
group processes of socialization and
conformity ensue.

This process will likely result in the
DISPLACEMENT OF
AGGRESSION. Primary group
structure, group action, group
dynamics, and group beliefs will
encourge the use of violence, which
will oftentimes be directed at
unguarded targets.
Figure 5.1 Revised Theoretical Outline
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CAH are more likley to occur in
groups whose BELIEF
SYSTEMS encourage values
often associated with immediate
self-interest, dehumanization
and violence. These beliefs are
legitimized through group
action. Moreover, authority and
law systems will play a role in
the dispersion and socialization
of primary group beliefs.

Existing theories identify precursors of CAH, which this study has generally
supported. Thus, the possibility that CAH will ensue is identifiable prior to international
law violation. Additionally, following Agnew’s logic, strain as a precursor to CAH can
even be minimized. This reasoning suggests that intervention programs aimed at
minimizing intense, widespread strain may be beneficial to quelling potential CAH
violations. Since the Nuremburg Trials the international community has focused its
attention on the creation of an international criminal justice system. However, existing
theories of CAH as well as the analysis reported in this thesis recommends that additional
international efforts to intervene in high risk CAH situations should be the focus of future
policies. Additionally, the case study highlights the complicated nature of CAH in that
many factors must occur, either sequentially or simultaneously, in order for CAH to
commence. For crimes in which culpability is hard to determine, programs based on
restorative justice may be more effective at quelling the emergence and continuation of
CAH. Specifically, the North Korean case study demonstrates that CAH violations
occurred for several decades with little acknowledgement from the international
community. In these cases in which time clouds culpability, restorative justice programs
may contribute more to the reconstruction process. Generally, Restorative Justice is
considered, “a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come
together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its
implications for the future” (Marshall as cited by Gade, 2013, p. 17).
Criminology recognizes that a multitude of factors affect criminality within a
society. Specifically, the case study of NK demonstrates the multifaceted nature of CAH.
Consequently, in order for international laws to be viewed as legitimate, they must be
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written in such a manner that holds responsible parties culpable. Again, the North Korean
case study demonstrates how it may be difficult to identify culpable parties in an everchanging environment like the international community. In addition, it can be challenging
to hold responsible parties culpable when atrocities have been occurring for decades.
Therefore international laws should focus less on retribution and more on restoring
conventional bonds.
The case study of NK has provided numerous examples of how the international
community has responded to North Korean law violations. However, reactions from
international community have been limited. For example, the complexity of the Korean
War diverted an international response. Though the USSR and the US came to an
agreement that ended the War, punishment was deemed unnecessary—no nation was held
accountable for the devastation of the War even though Kim Il-Sung played an integral
role in the onset of the conflict. As a result, North Korea has successfully isolated itself for
the last 55 years. However, similarly situated cases within the international community
have resulted in the establishment of ICTs and despite their relative ineffectiveness, the
establishment of ICTs does draw attention to CAH violations. Accordingly, the analysis
presented in this thesis proposes that either an ICT or a reconciliation committee be
established to intervene, monitor, and prosecute CAH violations in NK. ICTs have been
established in many cases of possible CAH violations however, reconciliation committees
have not been as relied upon by the international community. The most renowned
reconciliation committee was established in South Africa at the end of apartheid.
In 1995, the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) was established through
South African legislative measures. Between 1948 and 1994, South Africa experienced a
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period of state-sponsored racial segregation known as apartheid. The TRC was South
Africa’s attempt at reuniting their nation. The TRC was comprised of three committees:
the human rights violation committee, the reparation and rehabilitation committee, and the
amnesty committee (Gade, 2013). The human rights committee was charged with
investigating violations during apartheid. The reparation and rehabilitation committee was
responsible for the creation of proposals aimed at rebuilding and strengthening the
community. The amnesty committee reviewed applications for exoneration utilizing a three
prong test. The crimes must have been: (1) politically motivated, (2) proportionate, and (3)
perpetrators must fully disclose the nature of their crimes (Gade, 2013). The international
community might use this structure in the creation of an international reconciliation
institution or in the formation of international reconciliation committees.
Criminologist have much to offer in the debate on how the international community
should handle North Korean relations. The overarching international goal is to encourage
North Korean desistance from CAH and in general, international desistance from CAH.
The willingness to testify demonstrated by COI interviewees suggests that the North
Korean authority’s political capacity may be diminishing. This could provide the
international community an opportunity to reach out to NK and effect its future policies.
The globalization of crime requires that criminologists delve into the study of such crimes
and contribute to the development of theories surrounding large-scale crimes like crimes
against humanity.

77

REFERENCES
Armstrong, C. (2005). “Fraternal Socialism”: The International Reconstruction of North
Korea, 1953-62. Cold War History, 5(2), 161–187.
Aviram, H. (2009). Mass atrocity and criminology. Theoretical Criminology, 13(487).
Barak, G. (1991). Crimes by the Capitalist State: An Introduction to State Criminality.
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Brannigan, A., & Hardwick, K. H. (2003). Genocide and General Theory. Control
Theories of Crime and Delinquency, 109–131.
Browning, C. R. (1993). Ordinary Men (p. 231). New York: HarperCollins.
Chambliss, W. J. (1988). State Organized Crime — The American Society of
Criminology , 1988 Presidential Address, 27(2), 183–209.
Cho, J., Kim, S., Son, G., Lee, K., Lee, K., Lim, S., & Han, D. (2013). White Paper on
Human Rights in North Korea (p. 551).
Chung, C. (1983). North Korea in the Sino-Soviet Dispute. Journal of Northeast Asian
Studies, 2(3), 67–85.
Cohen, A. K. (1990). New directions in the study of justice, law, and social control (pp.
101–125). New York : Plenum Press, c1990.
Dubler, R. (2008). What’s in a Name? A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity. Australian
International Law Journal.
Elder, G. H., & Rockwell, R. C. (1979). The Life-Course and Human Development: An
Ecological Perspective. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 2(1), 1–
21.
Eugene Kim, C. I. (1985). The Two Koreas: Leadership, System Characteristics, and
Domestic and Foreign Policy Performances. Korea and World Affairs, 9(1), 116–.
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative
Inquiry, 12(2), 219–245

78

Foley, J. (2003). Korea’s Divided Families: Fifty Years of Seperation (p. 212). London:
Routledge Curzon.
Fouzder, A. J. (2011). Institutional Response to Crime against Humanity : A Case Study
on Bangladesh By, (May).
Friedrichs, D. O., & Friedrichs, J. (2002). The World Bank and Crimes of Globalization:
A Case Study, 29(November 2000).
Gade, C. B. N. (2013). Restorative Justice and the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Process. South African Journal of Philosophy, 32(June), 10–35.
Gills, B. (1992). North Korea and the crisis of socialism: The historical ironies of
national division. Third World Quarterly, 13(1), 107–130.
Green, P. J., & Ward, T. (2000). State Crime, Human Rights, And the Limits of
Criminoiogy. Social Justice, 27(1).
Hagan, J., & Kaiser, J. (2011). The displaced and dispossessed of Darfur: explaining the
sources of a continuing state-led genocide. The British Journal of Sociology, 62(1),
1–25.
Hagan, J., Levi, R., & Ferrales, G. (2014). Internal and External Dynamics of Regime
Change at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Justice :
Law and Social Inquiry, 31(3), 585–616.
Hagan, J., & Rymond-Richmond, W. (2009). Criminology confronts genocide: whose
side are you on? Theoretical Criminology, 13(503).
Hagan, J., Rymond-richmond, W., & Parker, P. (2005). The Criminology of Genocide:
The Death and Rape of Darfur. Criminology, 43(3), 525–561.
Harff, B. (2014). No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust ? Assessing Risks of Genocide
and Mass Political Murder since 1995. American Political Science Review, 97(1),
57–73.
Hirschi, T., & Gottfredson, M. (1983). Age and the Explanation of Crime ’. American
Journal of Sociology, 89(3), 552–584.
Hoffman, B. (2009). Mobilizing criminology: The boundaries of criminological science
and the politics of genocide. Theorhetical Criminology, 13(481).
Hola, B., Bijleveld, C., & Smeulers, A. (2011). Punishment for Genocide – Exploratory
Analysis of ICTR Sentencing. International Criminal Law Review, 11, 745–773.
79

Horton, G. (2005). Dying Alive (p. 635). Muang: Images Asia.
Kim, A. (1970). Soviet Policy in North Korea. World Politics, 22(2), 237–254.
Kim, G.-D. (1990). The Legacy of Foreign Intervention in Korea: Division and War.
Korea and World Affairs, 14(2), 275–302.
Kim, Y.-S. (1971). North Korea’s Relationship to the USSR: A Political and Economic
Problem. Bulletin Institute for the Study of the USSR, 18(6), 34–48.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013a). London October 23-- 3.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013b). London October 23-- 4.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013c). Seoul August 20-- PM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013d). Seoul August 21-- AM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013e). Seoul August 21-- PM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013f). Seoul August 22-- AM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013g). Seoul August 22-- PM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013h). Seoul August 23-- PM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013i). Seoul August 24-- AM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013j). Seoul August 24-- PM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013k). Tokyo August 29-- PM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013l). Tokyo August 30-- AM.
Kirby, M., Biserko, S., & Darusman, M. (2013m). Tokyo August 30-- PM.
Köchler, H. (2003). Global Justice Or Global Revenge?: International Criminal Justice
at the Crossroads (p. 101). Peter Lang International Academic Publishers.
Lankov, A. N. (1960). Kim Takes Control : The “Great Purge” in North Korea , 1956 –
1960, 26(1), 1956–1960.
Maier-Katkin, D., Mears, D. P., & Bernard, T. J. (2009). Towards a criminology of
crimes against humanity. Theoretical Criminology, 13(2), 227–255.

80

Matsueda, R. L. (2009). Toward a new criminology of genocide: theory, method, and
politics. Theoretical Criminology, 13(495).
Mercer, J. (2013). Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War. International Organization,
67(02), 221–252.
Millett, A. R. (2001). Introduction to the Korean War. The Journal of Military History,
65(4), 921–935.
Moon, C. (2011). The crime of crimes and the crime of criminology: genocide,
criminology and Darfur. The British Journal of Sociology, 62(1).
Mullins, C. W., & Rothe, D. (2004). The International Criminal Court and the Control of
State Crime: Prospects and Problems. Critical Criminology, 12, 285–308.
Nuremburg. (1945). Consititution of the International Military Tribunal. The Avalon
Project. Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu
Olusanya, O. (2013). A Macro-Micro Integrated Theoretical Model of Mass Participation
in Genocide. British Journal of Criminology, 53(5), 843–863.
doi:10.1093/bjc/azt027
Paik, H. S. (1995). The Soviets Objectives and Policies in North Korea 1945-1950. Korea
and World Affairs, 19(2), 269–293.
Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies. (2014). Pyongyang.
Rothe, D. L., & Friedrichs, D. O. (2006). Crimes of the State. Social Justice, 33(1).
Rudolph, P. (1959). North Korea and the Path to Socialism. Pacific Affairs, 32(2), 131–
143.
Sampson, R. J. (2005). A Life-Course View of the Development of Crime. The ANNALS
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 602(1), 12–45.
Savelsberg, J. J. (2009). Genocide, criminology, and Darfur. Theoretical Criminology,
13(477).
Scalapino, R. A. (1977). In the Age of National Communism: The International Order
and Communism in Northeast Asia. Journal of Asiatic Studies, 20(2), 1–18.
Smeulers, A., & Hola, B. (2009). Criminology Discovers International Criminal Law.
Suh, D. S. (1973). The Preconceived Fromula for Sovietization: The Communist
Takeover of North Korea. Journal of East and West Studies, 1(1).

81

Turk, A. T. (1964). Prospects for Theories of Criminal Behavior. The Journal of Criminal
Law, Criminology, and Political Science, 55(4), 454–461.
U.N. (1945). UN Charter.
U.N.S.C. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(1993).
U.N.T.S. (1976). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In United NationsTreaty Series.
UNGA. (2014). Report of the Comission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea.
Williams, P. R., Ulbrick, J. T., & Worboys, J. (2012). Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes:
The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis, 45, 473–504.
Yang, S. C. (1980). The Kim Il-Sung Cult in North Korea. Korea and World Affairs,
5(1), 161–186.
Yin, R. K. (2014). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Essential guide to
qualitative methods in organizational research (Vol. 5, p. 282).
Zimbardo, P. (2007). The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil.
New York: Random House.
Zimbardo, P., Haney, C., Banks, W. C., Phillips, S., Gorchoff, D., Rosenfeld, C., …
Sparaco, J. (1971). The Stanford Prison Expiriment, (August).

82

